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An enhancement to TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) is proposed to give additional security 
between cooperating client/server programs. 
Several modes of operation are available including: program controlled mode where new ioctl 
commands are used to provide explicit control over the actions taken by the kernel in the 
provision of security services, client or server controlled mode where one of the client/server 
pair initiates and controls security features without the knowledge or intervention of the other 
party and finally kernel controlled mode where two kernels will establish and maintain secure 
communication without intervention of either client or server program. 
To achieve client or server controlled and kernel controlled operation, three new TCP option 
fields have been defined to allow the passage of security setup information at session 
establishment time. The threeway handshake session setup of TCP is used as a vehicle to 
piggyback information used to establish the type of encryption scheme in use as well as 
encrypted session keys. 
Flexibility in the type of encryption schemes used is permitted with open access to the methods 
of defining new schemes to be used and mapping of these schemes to new scheme numbers 
within the TCP option fields. Schemes implemented as part of this work include an optimised 
version of DBS (Data Encryption Standard) in both codebook and feedback mode, Triple DES 
in both codebook and feedback modes, LOKI is used in codebook mode and a new stream 
oriented cipher called Sapphire is used to compare purpose built stream ciphers with more 
traditional block methods. 
The implementation of the protocol is described as it applies to the Linux operating system 
kernel structures, program code and the new formats for TCP. Some performance issues are 
then canvassed as they apply to the various schemes employed. The performance measures 
apply to client/server programs exchanging data either on a single host or between adjacent 
hosts on an otherwise unloaded ethernet network. When other than trivial encryption schemes 
are employed the cost of encryption becomes dominant and network bandwidth restriction are 
not an issue. 
The procedures required to add a new encryption scheme using the formats and entry points of a 
canonical scheme is then described. Using this description it is possible to implement any new 
scheme that can be expressed in this canonical format. 
Possible suggestions for enhancements to overcome potential bottlenecks are then discussed and 
a conclusion is given. 
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1. Introduction 
With the advent of allpervasive global network technology the requirement for improved 
security over existing networks will increase. Authorities are adopting principles of privacy 
and confidentiality over information held by others. Increasingly the onus of responsibility 
for demonstrating the appropriate need for, handling of, and disposal of such information is 
falling on the holders of such information. 
The handling of information includes (but is not limited to) gathering and dissemination 
electronically It is possible that the gathering and dissemination of such information may 
require transmission over various types of networks. In general, if no special action is taken, 
information is transmitted and received in a format that can be readily interpreted by a 
determined third party. Consider the situation where a sensitive database is contained on a 
host in a format that is encrypted on disk. In a static sense the data is protected against 
unauthorised disclosure but in a dynamic sense when remote access is required, the DBMS 
system would, for example, decrypt data on the DBMS host and present it to users in a 
format that could be handled by existing network and application protocols such as TCP, 
telnet and rlogin. The transmission of such data over shared network facilities may pose an 
unacceptable risk of disclosure, particularly if such facilities are shared between 
organisations with different statutory requirements and cultures. The need to provide an 
end-to-end secure service has been discussed by Brown [12] and loannidis [18] and is 
discussed below. 
This work takes a similar approach at a different level and will enhance an existing transport 
protocol to enable users to pass data between applications with an increased level of security 
and hence address some of the possible concerns of disclosure and unauthorised access 
discussed above. As a starting point for the work, it is assumed that we have access to a 
notionally secure application and host operating system environment. Should either of these 
be compromised then any level of network security will be to little avail. 
Several concepts have been introduced and will now be expanded on. These include the 
notion of security and the principíeles of encryption that can be used to enhance security. 
Next, concepts concerning networking are discussed together with a more indepth 
consideration of the Transmission Control Protocol. Previous work in the general area of 
network security is then discussed along with some of the pros and cons of such approaches. 
Any networking software requires an underlying operating system and hardware to run on. 
In this instance the Linux operating system was chosen running on a typical Intel® 80486 PC. 
A general description of Linux is provided together with a brief tour of how a simple 
network application would proceed during execution in the kernel. A description of the 
enhanced functionality proposed is then presented along with descriptions of the 
architectural and implementation changes that are required to make it possible. Some 
performance measures are provided to estimate the cost of such enhancements. A conclusion 
is provided together with some possible future extensions. 
2. Security and Encryption 
Security is linked with the idea of protection. An entity is considered valuable if it is worth 
spending effort protecting it. The act of protection is security. Security comes in many forms. 
Physical security is concerned with protection of real assets and can include such things as 
restricting access with fences, locked rooms, guards, sealed channels, fire suppression, 
tamper proof terminals etc. Logical security is concerned with the protection of information 
and is used to complement the protection provided by physical security. The science of 
logical security as it applies to data is known as cryptography. 
Cryptography can provide a number of functions. These include the ability to hide 
information in messages providing privacy and the ability to identify the source of messages 
providing authentication. The fundamental tool used in cryptography is encryption. 
Encryption provides a method of transforming a message in such a way that it is readable by 
authorised receivers and unreadable by anyone else. The basic property of the encryption 
transformation is that it is not easily invertible without access to a parameter known as the 
enciphering key. From [34] we have a formal definition of a cryptosystem (an 
implementation of an encryption transformation) as a single parameter family of invertible 
functions, 
EK;KgK 
where K is the keyspace, which is of finite length. If M is the message space and C is the 
cryptogram space, the we must have the following properties: 
• An enciphering algorithm 
for any fixed encryption key KgK is an invertible transformation of the message space 
into the cryptogram space, 
• There is an inverse algorithm E^ = DK called the decryption algorithm. 
DK:C->M 
Such that DK(C) = DK[EK(M)] = M; 
• The keys should uniquely define the enciphered message, 
Whereas cryptography is concerned with designing and implementing secure encryption 
algorithms, cryptanalysis is concerned with the recovery of messages without recourse to the 
cipherkey. The cryptanalyst may have multiple motives including the ability to read 
ciphered messages, modify messages without authority, pose as a legitimate user, replay 
messages or transactions or deny service. The main thrust of this paper is to thwart attempts 
to read messages without authority, however certain other aims mentioned above may also 
be less effective as a result of these enhancements. 
2.1. Symmetric Encryption 
Symmetric encryption is a scheme where two parties share a common cipherkey K and a 
known encryption and decryption scheme. The encryptor forms a cryptogram by passing a 
message M through the encryption scheme using the cipherkey K producing ciphertext C. 
The ciphertext is then transmitted to the receiver who applies the decryption scheme using 
the same cipherkey. This reveals the original message. 
M Encryption C Decryption M • 
K K 
Fig #1 - Symmetric Encryption 
2.1.1. DES 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) ANSI-X3.92-1981 provides an implementation of a 
symmetric encryption scheme. It uses a sixteen round system of permutations and 
substitutions with a 56 bit key and 64 bit blocks of data. The permutations are provided by 
bit selection tables for bitwise reordering. The substitution function is provided by the so 
called S-boxes which take 6 bit input values that have previously been expanded from 4 bits 
and produces 4 bit output values. Each round uses the permutation and substitution 
function along with a permuted key choice based on the original key. 
ANSI-X3.106-1983 Data Encryption Standard - Modes of Operation, provides two methods 
of using DES. In Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) input is blocked in 64 bit blocks and each 
block is encrypted using the same 56 bit cipherkey to produce 64 bit output blocks. 
Clear 64 bits DES 64 bits Ciphertext Text 
— •— • 
Key 
Fig #2 - DES ECB Mode 
In Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) the results of previous encryptions are fed back to the 
current input. As in ECB input data is blocked into 64 bit blocks. The first block is combined 
with an initial vector and encrypted to give the first cryptogram. The cryptogram is 
forwarded to the receiver and also replaces the initial vector. The second block is now 
combined with the initial vector and encrypted giving the second cryptogram and replacing 
the initial vector and so on. 
Clear 
Text 
64 bits ^ DES 64 bits Ciphertext U ' 
Key 
Fig #3 - DES CBC Mode 
There has been considerable controversy over the perceived secrecy in the early 
development of DES [38]. There was concern that the details of the design principals of the 
S-boxes were kept secret and that the 56 bit key was too short. To overcome this second 
problem it is possible to use DES in what has become known as Triple-DES. In this mode two 
56 bit keys and three phases of encryption are used. The first phase encrypts with the first 
key. The second phase deaypts with the second key. The third phase again encrypts with the 
first key. This mode of operation provides enhanced security compared to ordinary DES. 
K1 
Cleartext 64 bits DES DES"̂  1 
K2 
Fig #4 - Triple-DES 
Other examples of symmetric algorithms include LOKI, FEAL and IDEA. 
2.2. Asymmetric Encryption 
Symmetric encryption assumes that the legitimate senders and receivers of a message have 
access to the secret key required for enciphering and deciphering. It is possible to arrange 
for an encryption scheme to be designed such that the key has two parts, one of these parts is 
public and globally known, the other part is private and known only to the receiver. A 
ciphertext message is constructed by encrypting with the public key and retrieved by 
decrypting with the private key. Such schemes are known as asymmetric encryption 
schemes. 





Fig #5 - Asymmetric Encryption 
Typically, asymmetric schemes use combinations of numeric problems thought to be 
intractable (such as factorisation and discrete logarithm] to implement the encrypting and 
decrypting functions. An example of an asymmetric scheme is RSA which uses the fact that 
it can reveal enough information to compute certain functions over discrete rings but 
maintain the necessary factors to decode the ciphertext in secret. 
The major disadvantage of asymmetric schemes designed to date is that to provide the 
required level of intractability the basic encryption and decryption processes tend to be 
computationally expensive compared to symmetric algorithms such as DES, For this reason 
asymmetric schemes tend to be used to distribute keys to be subsequently used by 
symmetric schemes. 
2.3. Block Cipher vs Stream Cipher 
The encryption schemes discussed so far have assumed that input data can be easily blocked 
in 64 bit blocks. This method of operation can be inconvenient in a networked environment 
where data may be transmitted on a byte (or even bit) oriented boundary. Adapting a block 
cipher scheme to a stream cipher scheme is relatively simple and involves using the block 
oriented cipher to provide a pseudo-random bit sequence that can be XOR'ed with any 
output stream to provide an encrypted stream. 
Clear 
Text 
bits ^ Ciphertext U " 
bits 
Fig #6 - Stream Cipher 
Alternatively, special purpose byte (or bit) oriented stream ciphers have been designed that 
operate without the requirement to use a pseudo random number generator as a source of 
bits. Examples of such ciphers include RC4, a proprietary system from RSA Data Security 
Inc. and the Sapphire Stream Cipher by Johnson [22]. The Sapphire Stream Cipher can be 
conceptually compared to a game of cards. The deck has 256 cards with face values ranging 
from 0 to 255. The initial deck is shuffled with values based on the user's key which can be 
up to 255 bytes long. In operation, five cards are drawn from the deck. The draw is based on 
three index variables (rotor , ratchet, avalanche) and the previous value of input, both plain 
and encrypted. These five cards are rotated in the deck and the three index values updated. 
Two of these updates (ratchet and avalanche) are based on values drawn and the third 
(rotor) is simply an increment. Now five cards are drawn based on the new values of the 
index variables and the existing values of the last input, both plain and enaypted. The face 
values of the five drawn cards are added modulus 256 and used to select another card whose 
face value is used as an index into the deck once again. This final draw provides a suitable 
byte to XOR with the input stream. Decryption is identical to encryption with the exception 
that the resulting XOR on the enciphered text produces the original plain text. 
The robustness of the Sapphire Stream Cipher is yet to be demonstrated. (Various follow 
ups to [22].) 
3. Networking 
The basic function of a network is to provide connectivity between two processes that wish 
to communicate. These processes may ultimately be human or machine and it is possible 
that there may be more than two processes. The International Standards Organisation (ISO) 
has provided a model known as the Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) that allows a layered 
approach to network connectivity to be developed. 
3.1. The ISO Reference Model of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
This seven layered model has been established by the International Standards Organisation 
(ISO) according to several principals. These include: 
• Each layer creates a new level of abstraction. 
• Each layer performs a well defined function (or functions). 
• Each layer should be able to define International Protocol Standards at its boimdary. 
• Information flow between layers should be minimal. 
ISO Reference Model 
Application Layer Application Layer 
Presentation Layer Presentation Layer 
Session Layer Session Layer 
Transport Layer Transport Layer 
Network Layer Network Layer 
Data Link Layer Data Link Layer 
Physical Layer Physical Layer 
Fig #7 
3.1.1. The Layers of OSI 
The seven layers in the OSI Model are: 
• The Physical Layer 
• The Data Link Layer 
• The Network Layer 
• The Transport Layer 
• The Session Layer 
• The Presentation Layer 
• The Application Layer 
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Generally they are shown as a stack of protocol blocks with the Application Layer at the top 
and the Physical Layer at the bottom. 
Each layer is briefly described below: 
3.1.1.1. The Physical Layer 
The primary concern of the physical layer is the format and transmission of bits of data. 
Various methods of transmitting bits can be used, as can various media. Issues addressed 
within this layer include mechanical, procedural and electrical interfacing as well as capacity 
and timing. The X.21 standard, which was approved in 1976, is an example of a Physical 
layer protocol which specifies how a DTE (Data Terminal Equipment) sets up and clears 
down calls with a DCE (Date Circuit-Terminating Equipment). 
3.LL2. The Data Link Layer 
This layer is concerned with providing a reliable and efficient method of communicating a 
set of bits, typically known as a frame, between two adjacent pieces of network hardware. In 
this context adjacent means that both pieces of hardware are joined by a conceptual "wire" 
and that bits entering one end of the "wire" will appear in the same order at the other end. 
The "wire" can be physical cable (metal or fibre optic), infrared, laser, satellite channel, etc as 
long as it appears "wire like". 
While it appears that sending and receiving frames along a piece of wire is simple, protocols 
at this level must deal with errors such as: line noise (which scrambles bits within a frame or 
loses entire fr^es) , the limited reception capacity of a receiving piece of network hardware 
(which can cause frames to be dropped or otherwise ignored), the underlying capacity of the 
"wire" and the possibility that frames may be duplicated by error (say, echo on a line) or 
design (a transmitter thought a frame was lost when it wasn't and resent it). Protocols which 
achieve the above goals are candidates for Data Link Protocols. Some examples include 
HDLC (High Level Data Link Control) and its subset LAPB (Balanced Link Access 
Procedure) which is often used with X.21 in achieving point to point or multipoint wide area 
connection. The standards of the IEEE 802 Committee deal with Data Link Protocols for local 
area networks including Ethernet and Token Ring. 
3.1.1.3. The Network Layer 
The function of the Network Layer is to deliver, via one or more "hops" along Data Link 
Layers, a set of data bits known typically as a Packet or Datagram from a source "Host" to a 
destination "Host". 
On receiving a data packet from the next highest level in the protocol stack (the Transport 
Layer) the network layer will choose the appropriate Data Link Layer interface and form a 
frame consisting of the data associated with the packet, the packet header (network 
addressing information that will not change as a result of hopping) and the Data Link header 
(interface addressing information for the current hop). This frame is then passed to the data 
Link Layer for transmission across the physical media. This process is continued on a hop by 
hop basis until the destination is reached at which time the packet is handed to the next 
highest layer of the protocol for processing. 
The Network Layer is responsible for routing between source and destination hosts. It is also 
typically responsible for congestion control. 
In the area of switched packet networks X.25 represents an International Standard for the 
implementation of a Network Protocol. Within the TCP/IP Internet suite IP (Internet 
Protocol) can loosely be considered a Network Layer protocol. 
3.1.1.4. The TVansport Layer 
The Transport Layer provides a reliable and efficient end to end message service. Whereas 
the Network Layer is concerned with the concept of a packet, whose characteristics are 
defined by underlying layers, the Transport Layer deals with messages which may be of 
arbitrary length and are defined by higher levels of the protocol. This requires the Transport 
Layer to provide multiplexing, fragmentation, de-fragmentation and buffering functions. 
While the Network Layer attempts to provide consistent delivery it can not guarantee such 
services. The Transport Layer must therefore provide a service without error, loss, 
rearrangement or duplication of messages. 
An International Standard for the Transport Layer is provided by X.75. In the TCP/IP 
Internet suite UDP can be loosely considered a Transport Protocol but lacks some of the 
reliability features described above. TCP includes such facilities as well as many others that 
could well be considered Session Layer features. 
3.LL5, The Session Layer 
The Session Layer builds on services provided by the Transport Layer. In particular the 
provision of user addressing. In general the Transport level provides host-to-host message 
delivery and the session layer provides user-to-user delivery by adding user identification to 
message headers thus allowing the receiving host to determine which user owns an 
incoming message. The Session Layer may also provide crash recovery, synchronisation, 
checkpointing facilities, transport layer congestion control or dynamic reconfiguration 
control over multiple transport paths. 
Within the TCP/IP Internet suite TCP provides much of the Session Level functionality 
described above. 
3.LL6. The Presentation Layer 
The Presentation Layer can be used to provide a range of add-in functions that are not 
readily adaptable at lower levels of the protocol stack. These services are, by their nature, 
added as needed, usually through shared libraries or additional operating system services. 
Traditionally, Encryption and Privacy measures are seen as belonging to the Presentation 
Level since it is desirable to encipher messages as close to their origin as possible. 
Other services that can be provided at the Presentation Level include data compression, 
Virtual Terminal functionality. Virtual File Systems and character set translation. 
In the Unix environment Virtual Terminal Protocols include such things as Telnet and Xll, 
while Virtual File Systems are provided by NFS and ftp. Many systems offer "3270 type" 
emulation packages that provide character translation function between ASCII and EBCDIC 
character sets. 
3.1.1.7. The Application Layer 
The Application Level can be used to provide services that have a specific functional 
requirements. This compares with the Presentation Level which provides general tools 
within the "Distributed Operating System" theme. 
Services may build on those provided by the Presentation Level and may include things 
such as distributed database management and its associated transaction processing facility, 
mail services and protocols, directory services and protocols, time services, authentication 
services, hierarchical storage management, news services and hypertext services. 
The Unix environment mail services are provides by SMTP [15] (among others), time 
services by NTP [10], authentication services by Kerberos [36] , news services by NNTP [15]. 
In the International Standards area mail protocols include X.400 with directory services 
provided by X.500. 
3.1.2. Deliveiy of Data through the Protocol Stack 
Typically each layer places a header on data that it receives from the next highest layer. 
When it reaches its final destination headers are removed one layer at a time and the final 
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Frame Check Code. 
Fig #7 - Layer Headers 
3.2. Security Issues 
Each layer of the protocol stack faces its own set of problems and solutions in the area of 
network security Some of these issues will be addressed in the following paragraphs with 
reference to examples of specific implementations at each level. (This is not meant to be an 
exhaustive coverage but rather an introduction). 
3.2. L Physical Layer Security Issues 
The issues of concern at the Physical Layer of the protocol stack are in many ways similar to 
the physical security issues faced by system implementors of all computer systems. To be 
secure from an attack that either collects intelligence or denies access, any system (computer 
or otherwise) must employ techniques of defence well known outside the computing 
industry. These include such things as: physically restricted areas, all round security in 
depth, segregated personnel responsibility, physical monitoring etc. In a network 
environment however, some of these techniques are difficult to implement and must be 
considered in the context of the geographically dispersed nature of the network. Two 
techniques that relate to the physical security of networks are presented below as examples. 
3.2.1.1. TEMPEST 
The acronym TEMPEST has two meanings. Firstly the offensive meaning used by 
intelligence gatherers, Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology, which 
works by monitoring emissions of electromagnetic radiation (EMR) from devices and 
reconstructing useful information from these emanations. Secondly TEMPEST has a 
defensive meaning, Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard, which are 
techniques used to hide, distort or baffle EMR so that offensive TEMPEST techniques will 
fail. 
All electromagnetic devices emit electromagnetic radiation. Some of this radiation is used to 
transmit infonnation but much is simply radiated off into space and this can be intercepted 
and reconstructed into coherent form. For example, VDUs typically work by using an 
electron gun to scan across a screen many times per second refreshing pixels which then 
glow for a short time before the next scan. The firing of the electron gun causes emissions of 
EMR which can be detected and intercepted, with the intelligence gatherer simply 
synchronising their own electron gun with the targets', thus replicating the image of the 
target screen on their own screen. Since all devices have characteristic signatures it is 
possible to "tune in" to a particular device at a distance of up to one kilometer. 
Although more difficult, the same techniques can by used for memory devices and I/O 
channels (at much shorter distances than VDUs] to reconstruct memory images and I/O 
traffic on target systems. 
In its defensive mode TEMPEST attempts to mask EMR emissions so that offensive 
TEMPEST techniques will fail. These techniques can be applied at a number of levels. 
Devices themselves can be baffled to reduce the level of EMR they radiate and hence reduce 
the range at which offensive TEMPEST is effective. At the next level, rooms, buildings or 
entire installations can be baffled so that non TEMPEST rated devices can not emanate EMR 
beyond secured boundaries. This could be effective in the case of a local area network where 
individual shielding would be impractical. 
While TEMPEST provides a significant level of physical security it is very expensive to 
implement and maintain and generally is only available to military and intelligence 
community users. 
3.2.1.2. Phreaking 
Just as government and company based networks need security, carrier based networks 
(télécoms) also need network security. This has been demonstrated by the emergence of a 
technique known as phreaking. 
Phreaking works by exploiting known (and sometimes undocumented) signaling and 
diagnostic features of modem telephone exchanges to gain unauthorised access to carrier 
services. Generally an acceptable level of human speech can be carried between the 700 and 
900 Hz range, by using frequencies well beyond these limits the national carriers can place 
routing, diagnostic and signaling information on the same physical circuits, thus avoiding 
duplication of infrastructure (data and control) on long distance networks. With a 
knowledge of such standards as the CCITT Signaling System 7 and the CCITT C5 C6 C7 
which deal with the way PABXs and Local Exchanges communicate plus access to some 
relatively cheap hardware for generating the required frequency tones, it has been 
demonstrated that unauthorised access within a variety of countries is possible. This 
uncontrolled access to national carrier facilities represents a potential security threat as well 
as a loss in revenue. 
3.2.2. Data Link Layer Security Issues 
Security at the Datalink Layer is generally restricted to encrypting the contents of frames 
since this layer is only concerned with a single hop on the network. This approach is 
acceptable when data is being transmitted over a point to point service such as a LAPB link 
when both sides know who the other side is and key distribution does not present a large 
administrative or technical overhead. In the case of local area networks however the problem 
of key distribution and proliferation among a potentially large number of network machines 
becomes a problem. 
Another shortfall with encrypting at this layer is that all intermediate network layers must 
have access to the frame encryption key to allow routing information to be extracted. This 
potentially compromises the user information in the frame. 
3.2.2. L End to End Encryption 
In the point to point case, security of a network can be enhanced by the placement of an 
encryption device as part of the sending and receiving modems or NTUs. Several 
commercial types of such devices exist and are readily available. 
3.2.3. Network Layer Security Issues 
As with the Datalink Layer, Network Layer security tends to involve encrypting network 
packets. In this case however host to host encryption can be established as network header 
information can be left in cleartext to allow the passage of a packet through the network. 
Within the TCP/IP Internet suite, the IP protocol includes provision for security extensions 
but lacks some of the key management and source authentication details required. A 
proposed protocol known as swIPe [19] addresses these issues and provides a mechanism to 
secure networks at this layer. 
These are several disadvantages in using a mechanism that encrypts data packets. Since 
encryption occurs at a relatively low level of the protocol stack the user is faced with the 
situation where higher layers of the stack must process user data "in clear" prior to reaching 
the Network Layer. Given that most implementations of higher level protocols (e.g. TCP and 
UDP) have facilities to trace and monitor data going through their respective layers the user 
must place considerable trust in the implementation of these layers as well as users that may 
have access to them (either as administrators or otherwise). 
Generally Network Layer services (e.g. IP and X.25) provide a connectionless service 
between two hosts. This implies that packets may be lost, duplicated and/or arrive out of 
order. These problems must be sorted out by higher layers of the protocol. When encryption 
is used care must be taken that all encryption activity on individual packets is independent 
of any other packet. 
3.2.3.L swIPe 
The swIPe protocol provides an extension to the TCP/IP Internet suite with three additional 
security services. 
• Data confidentiality: Protection against unauthorised access to data being transmitted. 
• Data integrity: Protection against alteration or replaying of traffic. 
• Source Authentication: Network addresses are authenticated as part of the protocol. 
SwIPe consists of three conceptual areas: 
• A Policy engine which determines the action to be taken on outgoing packets, whether to 
accept incoming packets and how to process accepted incoming packets. 
• A Key management engine which handles the production and distribution of keys. 
Master keys are dealt with on a manual basis. 
• The Security engine which does the actual work of encryption, authentication, integrity 
and confidentiality checking under the direction of the Policy engine. 
SwIPe packets are enclosed within IP packets using the IPIP extension to IP (IPIP - IP inside 
IP Protocol). The contents of the packets are encrypted using DES with MD5 used for 
authentication. 
In operation, a packet to be transmitted is passed to swIPe where the policy engine decides 
whether authentication and/or encryption is required. If so, then the key management 
engine provides appropriate keys and the security engine does the required 
encryption/authentication passing the packet on to IP for transmission to the required host. 
On reception the receiving host takes roughly the opposite path to deliver clear data to the 
user. 
Since IP does not provide a reliable delivery service the keys used to transmit packets 
belonging to the same session must be fixed. This eliminates the possibility of using any 
form of feedback stream cipher in the operation of this protocol. Similarly all packets must 
be padded to the minimum block size for encryption thus wasting potential bandwidth. 
3.2.4. IVansport Layer Security Issues 
The Transport Layer provides a convenient place to segregate an organisations network from 
the outside world or other networks within the organisation. The boundaries of these 
networks are equipped with gateways to provide services such as protocol and media 
conversion, interfacing to telecommunication carriers and network security. When a gateway 
is used at a network boundary to provide security features it is often called a firewall. 
As with the Network Layer it is possible to provide an end to end encryption facility 
between two "networks" over a hostile internet. In contrast to the Network Layer the 
Transport Layer provides a reliable message passing service thus allowing the use of more 
sophisticated feedback stream ciphers instead of the fixed key type arrangement used by 
swIPe. 
3.2.4. L Firewalls 
The objective of a firewall is to prevent unauthorised access to the "insides" of a protected 
network by a variety of means. Within TCP/IP networks it is possible to establish gateways 
that discriminate on network traffic based on source and/or destination IP addresses thus 
only allowing known hosts to connect into or out off the protected area of the network. It is 
also possible to limit access to certain TCP ports, thus only allowing certain services that use 
well known addresses such as telnet or ftp, etc to function through certain hosts. These 
restrictions can include running certain services such as mail, domain name server and time 
servers on only trusted hosts within the network and thus funneling all such functions to 
and from them in a controlled fashion. 
Monitoring functions can be performed on such firewalls by including well known 
"wrapper" software which intercepts and records requests of a suspicious nature. 
3.2.5. Session Layer Security Issues 
At the Session Layer it is possible, for the first time in the protocol stack, to differentiate 
between individual users in a meaningful way. To this point, only system generated or 
stored keys have been used for encryption purposes. It is now possible and convenient to 
obtain keys directly from users on a use by use basis. This allows for the implementation of 
features which include such things as one time use scratch keys and challenge response 
mode protocols. 
Some of these concepts have been implemented in secured versions of telnet and ftp. 
3.2.5.1. Secure telnet/ftp 
Although telnet and ftp protocols have been described as belonging to the Presentation 
Level services, the extensions proposed by Brown [12,13,14] can loosely be considered 
"Session Level" since they occur below Presentation services such as file transfer and screen 
interpretation. 
In the proposed protocol, telnet and ftp sessions can include a challenge response sequence 
that allows a host to authenticate a potential user from a remote and unsecured network by 
passing a 64bit random number to the user and verifying that the response is appropriate. 
The reverse can also be achieved. Having authenticated that the user/host is who they said 
they were the pair can now exchange data using either the DES or LOKI encryption schemes. 
These facilities can be turned on or off at any time. 
3.2.6. Presentation Layer Security Issues 
Little implementation or standardisation effort has been placed into the general area of 
Presentation Level services with most services being provided on a ad-hoc basis. One 
attempt to provide such services in the area of security comes from AT&T which has 
developed a grab bag of library routines to assist in the provision of general purpose 
encryption tools. 
3.2.6. L CryptoLib 
CryptoLib [26] provides a collection of routines that can be used as addin services when 
developing secure network protocols. The library is written in C and provides a portable and 
efficient method of supporting public and private key systems. The advantage of having 
such a library at this level of the protocol stack (as opposed to the Application Layer) is that 
each application does not have to rebuild the functionality provided by the library. Facilities 
provided include: 
• Big integer creation and manipulation tools 
• Big Arithmetic functions: addition subtraction, division, multiplication and shifting. 
• Modular exponentiation and multiplication and the modulo operation. 
• Bitwise AND,OR and XOR 
• Chinese Remainder Theorem speedup of exponentiation 
• Quadratic residue test, square root (mod prime), square root (mod composite of two 
primes) 
• Random number generators - pseudo and true 
• Prime number generators and Primality test 
• Euclid's Extended Greatest Common Divisor algorithm 
• DES encryption and decryption 
• RSA methods 
• El Gamal methods 
• NIST key generation and DSA 
• NIST Secure Hash Standard (SHS) 
3.2.7. Application Layer Security Issues 
At the application level, security of services is required. These must be adapted to take into 
account the type of service being offered and the level of security required. The price of this 
flexibility is that security related issues must be provided for every application on a case by 
case basis. 
Two examples of security enhancements at the Application Layer are provided below. The 
first deals with enhancements for electronic mail and the second with a distributed 
authentication scheme developed as part of Project Athena [36]. 
3.2.7.1. PEM 
PEM or Privacy Enhanced Mail [8,23,25] provides electronic mail users with security 
enhanced procedures for use over the Internet. It uses both public and private key 
encryption methods and supports a key management procedure as part of its protocol. 
The services provided by PEM include confidentiality, authentication, message integrity 
assurance and non-repudiation of origin. Interoperability is provided by making use of the 
existing textual mail environment provided by SMTP (RFC822) by translating encrypted 
messages into a canonical format prior to using the underlying mail transport facilities. 
The PEM system applies security prior to any underlying transport system and can be 
regarded as a true end to end security enhancement. 
While PEM provides some enhanced services, other are not provided. These include access 
control, traffic flow confidentiality address list accuracy routing control, other issues relating 
to the reuse of serials by multiple users, assurance of message receipt and non deniability of 
receipt, automatic association of acknowledgement with original messages and message 
duplication and replay prevention. 
PEM works by encapsulating an existing mail message with well defined headers specifying 
the format and key retrieval information required for reading/authenticating the message. A 
message in such format is translated into canonical format (printable characters) acceptable 
to SMTP. On delivery the receiving PEM uses the header information along with key 
information provided by the receiver to decode/authenticate the message. 
3.2.7.2. Kerberos 
Kerberos [36] provides trusted third party authentication services in a distributed network 
environment. It does this by maintaining a database of clients and their associated private 
keys and using these keys to convince one client that another is really who they say they are. 
Once authentication has been established Kerberos can then issue session keys that have a 
limited life span. These keys are called tickets and have a one to one relationship between a 
client and a server. Once a ticket expires a new ticket must be obtained to gain access to a 
service again. 
The ticket issuing function can also be delegated to a Ticket Generating Server which is 
separate from the original Kerberos authenticator. The database of clients is generally 
maintained in a read only fashion and updated offline to reduce the possibility of 
compromise. 
The implementation of Kerberos requires the modification of many standard operating 
system facilities such as login and the BSD 'r' commands so that they use the Kerberos 
authentication functions. 
3.3. TCP 
Having considering networking in general, specific issues concerning the Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) [30] are discussed below. 
TCP is one of a number of protocols originating from the TCP/IP Internet Protocol Suite that 
comes from research funded by the Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). 
This suite contains many communication protocols that can be used as the basis for building 
large connected networks (internets) that are able to run on a myriad of host platforms over 
diverse interconnecting network hardware and services. 
As mentioned above, the TCP protocol sits above some underlying network delivery 
protocol and has been designed to provide a reliable stream delivery service over a 
potentially unreliable network. The relevant position of TCP and some protocols directly 
related to it is shown below. 
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Fig #9 - TCP's position in the network structure 
With the goal of reliability established TCP provides a number of features that characterise 
the protocol. 
The TCP protocol is a byte oriented stream with application programs transferring data in 
blocks of 8-bit bytes making up arbitrary chunks of data. The data formed in such streams is 
considered to be without structure or format and it is up to the application to manage or 
impose any format at some higher level. 
The TCP protocol provides a Virtual Circuit Connection. Two processes communicate 
through a conceptual scheme similar to the placement of a telephone call. In this scheme 
there are methods of connection (calling) and accepting connections (pickup or answer), 
when connections have been established communication can take place until one or both 
parties decide to finish a connection (hangup). In the case of errors or unexpected 
disconnections, methods are provided to inform the other party that the connection has been 
discontinued. 
TCP also provides buffering to improve the efficiency of use of any underlying network. An 
application program may send single octets of data at a time or huge packets but the TCP 
protocol buffers, disassembles or assembles packets or messages then multiplexes 
transmission over the network layer of the software. At the other end of the network TCP 
will demultiplex packets as required and deliver them to the application in the same order 
that they were sent. 
TCP provides full duplex connection so that applications can send and receive data on the 
same connection "at the same time". 
The area of TCP that is of particular interest is the method of establishing sessions or 
connections between co-operating processes. It is at the point of establishing connections 
that it is most convenient to establish encryption. The distinction is made between the 
architecture of establishing a connection, the formats and protocols of messages involved in 
making a connection and the implementation details of making a connection. These three 
differing levels have an impact on what is possible within the scope of TCP. 
3.3.1. The architecture of a TCP connection 
The architecture of a connection refers to a high level description of the activities of 
establishing a connection. It does not concern itself with the details of the meaning of bit 
patterns within a frame or packet. 
The basic architecture of a TCP connection is a three way handshake. This provides the level 
of reliability needed for a full duplex connection oriented protocol where it may happen that 
two processes decide to initiate a connection with each other simultaneously. The three way 
handshake is designed to provide correct synchronisation regardless of the underlying 
delivery mechanism and regardless of the order of actions taken by processes attempting to 
establish a connection. When two processes are about to establish a connection we can call 
one the client and one the server. Without loss of generality the client can be said to initiate 
the session when it sends a SYN [synchronisation) message to the server. The client enters a 
state known as SYN-SENT and waits. The server will, at some time in the future, receive a 
SYN message and will respond by sending a SYN message with an ACK [acknowledge) 
attached. The server will then enter a state known as SYN-RECEIVED. At some later time 
the client will receive the SYN-ACK message and will répond with a plain ACK message. 
The client will then enter the ESTABLISHED state. The server then receives the ACK 
message and enters the ESTABLISHED state. Thus a connection is established by three way 
handshake. 
Client Program Server Program 
Fig #8 - Establishing a connection 
The diagram shows the progress of a three way handshake. Time travels down the page and 
messages of appropriate type are indicated by arrows. State transitions are shown along the 
respective sides of the client and server. 
3.4. Formats and Protocols of TCP 
Formats and protocols give meaning and semantics to bit patterns within data packets used 
to express the architecture of TCP. This is the case with both TCP and its associated IP 
protocol. The basic structure of the TCP message is a TCP header followed by arbitrary data. 
The header is padded to a 32 bit boundary as is the data. 
The header area contain a minimum of five 32 bit words with a format shown below. 
Format of a TCP Header 
0 4 10 16 24 32 
Source Port Destination Port 
Sequence Number 
Acknowledgement Number 
Hlen Reserved Code Bits Window 
Checksum Urgent Pointer 
Options Padding 
Data 
• • • 
Fig #9 
The source and destination ports identify the end points of the connection. Host addresses 
are dealt with by the IP Protocol which encapsulates the TCP message. The sequence 
number identifies the place in the input stream where the data in this packet belongs. The 
acknowledgement number identifies the next position expected to be received. Hlen is the 
number of 32 bit words in this header and is used as an offset to find the beginning of the 
data. Code Bits indicate whether the current message contains urgent data, whether this 
message has a valid acknowledgement field i.e. is an ACK, whether data on this connection 
was pushed i.e. buffers explicitly flushed by application request, whether we want to reset 
the connection i.e. hangup, whether this is a SYN message and whether this is the last 
message of this connection. The window field indicates how much buffer space is available 
on the sending host. This field can be used to restrict sending data when there is no buffer to 
save it. Checksum provides a method of verifying the integrity of the header. The urgent 
pointer (when valid) indicates the offset of out of band data (Out of band data is discussed 
below). 
3.4.1. Option fields 
Following the urgent pointer we find the optional option fields. Option fields provide TCP 
with a mechanism to pass relatively small arbitrary messages outside the standard data 
stream. The original TCP protocol standard defines the format of option lists as follows. 
8 bits 8 bits n bytes 
Fig #10 - Format for Option fields 
Where "Option #" is an option number between 0 and 255. Length provides the number of 
bytes that the total option field contains (including the Option # and the Length). The data 
can be arbitrary data associated with the option. The TCP standard defines three option 
numbers: 
Fig #11 - End of Options 
Option 0 is the end of option list option. This option can be used to terminate a list of 
multiple option fields in an option list. Note the length field is two bytes, these being the 
option number and the length field itself. 
Fig #12 - Nop Option 
Option 1 is the nop option. This option is a no operation option and is simply a place holder 
in an option list. Again the length field is two bytes. 
8 bits 8 bits 16 bits 
Fig #13 - MSS Option 
Option 2 is the Maximum Segment Size (MSS) which allows a TCP to set the maximum size 
of a message that it is willing to accept. 
All other option are undefined but available for future use. Option fields will be used to 
carry indications that encrypted data streams are in use and this is discussed at length below. 
3.4.2. Data 
Data consists of an arbitrary number of bytes. Each byte is assigned a conceptual sequence 
number that defines its position in the datastream. 
Typically data is delivered in the order prescribed by the sequence numbers. There is, 
however, a facility that allows data to be delivered out of this strict sequence. The so called 
Urgent Pointer gives the position of such "out of sequence" data and one of the Code Bits 
indicates the existence of the urgent data. When a TCP receives a message with urgent data it 
immediately delivers this data to the application, bypassing any data that is expected or 
already buffered. 
3.5. Implementation of a connection in TCP 
The details of the implementation of TCP are dependent on the method of delivery. A TCP 
can reside in a variety of hardware and software platforms. These range from special 
purpose routers and protocol converters to general purpose hosts. In a host based 
environment the TCP can be part of the kernel or part of the user's address space depending 
on the type of host. The particular implementation discussed below runs TCP as part of a 
kernel on an inexpensive multiuser host. 
4. Linux 
Linux is a POSIX compliant implementation of UNIX written for inexpensive multiuser 
hosts, predominantiy Intel 80486 based microprocessors. The Linux project was started to 
provide a shareware version of UNIX with full source code distribution. Various utilities, 
compilers and tools from the GNU project are used to build and maintain the system. 
Currently the Linux operating system is selfsupporting, i.e. support and development of 
Linux can be undertaken from within a Linux environment. Support is provided for a range 
of hardware including video adapters, disks, CD-ROMS, sound cards, modems, tape drives. 
The implementation used and described below consists of an Osborne 80486 based PC with 
a 240MB Quantum Fixed Disk and VD24X Diamond Video Adapter running Linux Version 
1.0.8, gcc version 2.5.8, X11R5 and Cornell tcsh 6.04. 
4.L Linux module organisation 
Linux is organised in a hierarchy of directories that reflect the modular design of the system. 
Typically system source code is located in a directory called Unux. This linux directory is 
typically located in lusrjsrc but this need not be so. 
The operating system module libraries are then arranged in directories according to their 
subsystem functions. Such functions include lib that is used to hold kernel libraries,/s which 
hold file system code etc. All network related code is held in the net directory. This directory 
holds the highest level interface code for the socket calls made by user programs. The net 
directory is further broken down into subdirectories containing implementations of the 
various domain types. Among the domain types is Internet which is found in the inet 
directory. This contains the source code for the entire internet suite as well as the extension 
proposed by this paper. 
At execution time, linkage between the highest levels of the socket interface and tiie specific 
implementations is provides by blocks of function pointers which are initialised dynamically 
at kernel startup time with domain initialisation routines. 
A small part of the directory structure of Linux is shown in the diagram below. 
• • • (read_write.c^ 
Fig #14 - Linux source code directory 
4.2. A tour of the Linux Networking Kernel Code 
4.2.1. The client 
We consider the actions that take place inside the kernel as a result of the execution of two 
simple client-server programs. The client program shown below opens an internet socket 
stream resulting in the return of a file descriptor [sock], initialises a data structure [sin] with 
values specifying the host and port that will be connected to, it connects the socket to that 







ii^include " c - s . h " 
^define BUFLEN 128 
main(argc,argv) 
int argc; 
char *argv[ ] ; { 
int sock,n; 
s t ruct sockaddr_in sin; 
unsigned char buf[BUFLEN]; 
sock = socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0); 
i f ( sock == -1 ) { 
fprintf(stderr ,"Socket returned - 1 \ n " ) ; 
e x i t ( - 1 ) ; 
} 
bzero((char * )&sin,sizeof(sin)) ; 
sin.sin_family = AF_INET; 
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(MYIP); 
sin.sin_port = htons(MYPORT); 
i f ( connect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&sin,sizeof(sin)) < 0 ) { 
fprintf (s tderr , "could not connectNn"); 
e x i t ( - l ) ; 
} 
while (( n = read (sock,buf,BUFLEN) ) > 0 ) { 
buf[n] = ' \ 0 ' ; 
puts(buf); 
} 
fputs ( " \n" , s tdout ) ; 
c lose(sock) ; 
e x i t ( 0 ) ; 
Fig #15 - A simple client program 
4.2.2. The server 
The server program provides data that is read by the client. Firstly the server creates an 
internet socket stream and assigns it to a file descriptor [sock], the server then initialises a 
structure for holding information about future communication links [sin). The values in this 
sin structure indicate that it will be an internet connection accepting connection on any 
incoming address that this host may be known as and on a specific TCP port number 
[MYPORT]. The socket [sock) and the address structure (sm) are then bound with the bind call 
and the file descriptor is set into a passive state with the listen call, at some time in the future 
a new file descriptor [wsock) is created when the client and server programs rendezvous via 
the clients connect. The server writes a message to the newly created file descriptor [wsock), 
closes its files and exits. The total result of the above is that the message "Hello World" is 










char *argv[]; { 
int sock,wsock,len; 
struct sockaddr_in sin,fsin; 
unsigned char pch[] = "Hello World"; 
sock = socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0); 
if ( sock == -1 ) { 




sin.sin_family = AF_INET; 
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; 
sin.sin_port = htons(MYPORT); 
if (bind(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&sin,sizeof(sin)) == -1 ) { 
fprintf(stderr,"bind returned an errorXn"); 
exit(-1); 
} 
if ( listen(sock,5) < 0 ) { 
fprintf(stderr,"listen could not listen?\n"); 
exit(-1); 
} 
wsock = accept(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&fsin,&len); 








Fig #16 - A simple server program 
We now consider the view from the kernel's side which is considerably more complex. The 
server is considered first as the client would exit with an error if the server was not ready to 
accept connections. 
4.2.3. The Server 
4.2.3.1. socket 
On making the call to socket the server enters the kernel through the _system_call entry point 
in linux/kemel/sys_call.S. The system routine to be executed is held in the eax register of 
the CPU and is used as an offset into a table {_sys_calljable) which forms the address that is 
then called by the 80486 call instruction. This call leads to the execution of the sys_socketcall 
function in linux/net/socket.c 
The parameters to the sys_socketcall routine are the type of socket call (socket, bind/connect 
... etc) which is encoded as an integer and the arguments relevant to the call. This allows a 
simple switch statement to be used to call the relevant routine. In this case sock_socket which 
is also located in linux/net/socket.c. 
The sock_socket routine takes as an argument the familiar family, type and protocol 
parameters of the application program socket call. It firstly searches the kernel's domain 
protocol table until it finds a matching family, which in this case will be the AFJNET 
domain. The protocol domain structure contains the necessary linkages between families of 
domains and their underlying subroutines. Having found the family of domains it then finds 
a free socket structure from the sockets array (defined in this file) by calling the subroutine 
sockjilloc. 
The socket structure which is returned from the sockjilloc is then partially initialised and 
completes its creation with a call through a pointer to a create function held in the domain 
protocol structure. In this case the called routine is inetjcreate in linux/net/inet/sock.c. The 
call to this routine represents the first real transition between protocol independent code and 
protocol specific code. 
The inet_create allocates a new structure called a sock to hold information necessary to 
maintain a AFJNET connection. It initialises this structure and links the necessary TCP 
routines through another type of protocol structure specific to AFJNET domains. It then 
links this sock into the socket structure allocated above in sock_socket. Finally the inetjcreate 
routine calls a protocol specific initialisation routine, which for AFJNET domains is a null 
routine. 
N o w w e return to sock_socket and allocate an operating system file descriptor through the 
routine getjd in linux/net/socket.c. This ensures that calls to read and write will be 
subsequently passed on to the appropriate handler routines. Sock_socket now returns the file 
descriptor to sys_socket which in turn returns to the user through the systemjcall gateway. 
4.2,3.2. bind 
The bind system call ends up at sys_socketcall following the same path as socket. At this point 
the switch statement takes us to sockjbind in lLnux/net/socket.c which simply ensures that 
the file descriptor passed as a parameter is valid and calls the underlying bind routine 
inetjbind. 
The inet_bind routine does some error checks and then copies the requested Internet TCP 
address structure from users address space into the relevant internal tables and sets some 
parameters where default values have not been specified. It then places the socket into the 
domain socket array with its appropriate port number. 
By the time the bind call has completed data structures in the kernel have been established 
from the file descriptor fd through to the actual TCP specific parameters held in the sock 
structure. This is shown below. 
The current pointer gives the location in the kernel's task structure array of the currently 
















Fig #17 - Data Structures within the kernel after a bind call. 
4.2.3.3. listen 
The listen calls ends up at sys_socketcall following the same path as socket. At this point the 
switch statement takes us to sockjisten in linux/net/socket.c which uses the file descriptor 
passed as a parameter to look up the kernel file pointer associated with this descriptor by 
calling sockfdjookup in linux/net/socket.c. Having found the file it then looks up the inode 
associated with the file using the sockijookup routine also in linux/net/socket.c Finally 
sockjisten calls inetjisten to initialise fields associated with the sock structure and sets a flag 
in the socket structure to accept connections. 
4.2.3.4. accept 
The accept call ends up at sys_socketcall following the same path as socket. At this point the 
switch statement takes us to sock_accept. sock_accept uses the file descriptor to return the 
kernel file using sockfdjookup in linux/net/socket.c which in turn uses the file and 
sockijookup in linux/net/socket.c to obtain the inode which points to the socket. The state of 
the socket is checked to ensure that it is in an appropriate state to be used in an accept call and 
then a new socket is allocated with sockjilloc. Having obtained the socket, its contents are now 
initialised b y using the inet_dup routine in linux/net/socket.c which simply calls inetjcreate 
using the original socket's sock protocol. 
The AFJNET specific accept routine inetjiccept in linux/net/socket.c is now called. 
inet_accept starts by deallocating any storage allocated to the data field in the new socket. It 
then calls the TCP specific tcp_accept in linux/net/inet/tcp.c which waits until a packet 
comes for it using a loop on the getjirstr from linux/net/inet/skbuff.c. When the buffer 
arrives the sock associated with this buffer is returned. This returns us to inetjiccept which 
assigns the returned sock to its socket, sets the TCP state to TCP_SYN_RECV and waits to 
establish a connection in the TCP_ESTABLISHED state by the usual TCP threeway 
handshaking method. 
A t the end of this w e have a new socket connection established with the existing process. 
This is used to carry further messages. 
4.2.3.5. write 
The write call enters the kernel though the usual _system_caU entry point in 
linux/kemel/sys_call.S. This leads to a call to sysjvrite in linux/fs/read_write.c which does 
a few error checks and then does an indirect call though a pointer to sock_write. sockjwrite in 
linux/net/socket.c calls inetjurite in linux/net/inet/sock.c which calls tcpjvrite though the 
protocol table associated with this socket, tcpjvrite in linux/net/inet/tcp.c loops until all of 
the data to be sent has been processed. Inside the loop tcpjvrite either creates a buffer to 
send and sends it or creates a partial buffer and queues that partial buffer. There are two 
places in the code where the memcpyjromfs routine is called to fetch user data from the user 
address space, one in the area where complete buffers are sent and the other where partial 
buffers are built. 
4,2.3.6. close 
The close call enters the kernel though the usual _system_call entry point in 
linux/kemel/sys_call.S. This leads to a call to sysjolose in linux/fs/open.c. sysjclose calls 
closeJp in linux/fs/open.c which calls sockjclose though the fanuliar function protocol 
pointer, sockjclose in linux/net/inet/sock.c looks up the inode associated with this file and 
calls sockjrelease in linux/net/socket.c. sockjrelease calls inetjrelease in linux/net/inet/sock.c 
which in turn calls tcpjolose in linux/net/inet/tcp.c which goes through the TCP 
handshaking shutdown required as part of the TCP protocol. 
4.2.4. The Client 
4.2.4.1. socket 
The operation of socket in the client program is the same as the server program. 
4.2.4.2. connect 
The connect enters the kernel in the same way as socket and other socket based calls and 
really starts its journey through sockjoonnect in linux/net/socket.c. sockjconnect calls 
inetjoonnect in linux/net/inet/sock.c which allocates a socket number if required and calls 
the tcpjoonnect routine in linux/net/inet/tcp.c which builds a header with the SYN bit set 
and transmits it to the desired host via IP. Control is then passed back to inet_connect where 
the kernel sets up a sleep_onJnterrupt state for this process and loops, waiting for either a 
timeout or a response to the connect which comes from tcp_rcv (described below). 
4.2.4.3. read 
The read call enters the kernel though the usual _system_call entry point in 
linux/kemel/sys_call.S. This leads to a call to sys_read in linux/fs/read_write.c which does 
a few error checks and then does an indirect call though a pointer to sockjread. 
sock_read in linux/net/socket.c looks up the socket associated with this file and then calls 
inet_read. inet_read in linux/net/inet/sock.c binds the socket if required then calls tcp_read. 
tqj_read in linux/net/inet/tcp.c deals with the complexity of reassembling incoming IP 
packets which may arrive out of sequence, duplicated or which may be entirely lost. The 
tcp_read routine starts by checking the consistency of calling parameters, it then checks 
whether we are attempting to receive urgent data. In the case of inetjread we are never 
attempting to read out of band data. If no data is available in the receive queue and no other 
errors have occurred the kernel reschedules and we resume when data becomes available. If 
data is currently available then it is removed from the receive queue and copied to the users 
address space. The amount of data available and copied is returned to the user to indicate 
success. 
4.2.4.4, tcpjrcv 
Although never called explicitly by the user, tcpjrcv in linux/net/inet/tcp.c is an important 
routine in the overall scheme of things, tcpjrcv is called by ipjcv in linux/net/inet/ip.c as 
the routine that handles an incoming IP datagram that is designated for TCP. tcpjrcv finds 
the socket that the packet belongs to by using the port, address and socket number and, for 
normal data, calls tcpjiata to place this data on the socket's receive queue. This is how 
tcpjread can reschedule and return to find data has appeared on the receive queue. The 
tcpjrcv routine also takes special action when a packet that requests a new connection 
arrives. After determining that a new connection is being requested, tcpjrcv calls the 
tcpjconnj-equest routine in linux/net/inet/tcp.c which takes the required steps to 
rendezvous with a previously "listened" socket which is "accepting". 
4.2.4.5. close 
The operation of close in the client program is the same as the server program. 
5. Design 
The general design of the proposed enhancement is now discussed. 
5.1. Design Assumptions 
It is intended that an enhancement to network security be provided. Any enhancements will 
require design decisions to be made regarding the architecture, protocols and 
implementation of the system. Assumptions and alternatives need to be weighed up when 
making these decisions. 
The first major assumption used to drive the decision making process for this enhancement 
is that the proposal will in no way "break" the existing architecture, protocols or operation of 
an existing (correct) implementation of TCP/IP. This is a desirable assumption as 
interoperability between existing implementations is critical if this enhancement is to be 
used in an environment where not all platforms have access to the enhancement. 
The second major assumption is that control and security may be maintained by either or 
both of the operating system kernel or end user application, depending on configuration and 
initialisation. This assumption allows greater flexibility in the use and deployment of this 
enhancement. 
The third major assumption is that TCP is the appropriate place to put a security mechanism. 
This will be discussed shortly. 
These assumptions will be tied to the design decisions made in the following paragraphs. 
5.2. The Architecture of the Proposed Enhancement 
The proposed enhancement consists of a conceptual layer above the TCP protocol in the 
network implementation stack. The layer is implemented largely as a separate module 
within the operating system kernel and is controlled by parameters set within the kernel at 
startup time and subsequently dynamically updated at runtime. 
Fig #18 - Security Layer in the Network Protocol Stack 
The basic architecture of the security layer is shown below. It consists of four modules: key 







Fig #19 - Functional Security Layer Modules 
5.2.1. Master Keys 
Master keys play an important role in the application of encryption to TCP. Each 
implementation of TCP must be able to establish secure communication with a known and 
trusted partner. Several mechanisms are available to establish this trust but at the end of any 
such mechanism there must be delivery of some key that two TCP's can agree on to encrypt 
data. 
5.2.1.1. Purpose of Master Keys 
The purpose of the master keys is to allow overall administration between pairs of TCP's. 
This two level approach to key management is similar to the way that we may use an 
asymmetric key exchange mechanism to exchange keys for a subsequent (faster) symmetric 
encryption operation. The keys used to implement the administrative functions can be 
unrelated to subsequent keys and need not even be the same encryption function. 
The presence of a mechanism for storing and using master keys is required because the 
second design assumption calls for the ability of applications to provide keys for individual 
sessions. This would be impractical if a single level key directory was imposed. 
5.2.1.2. Initialisation of Master Keys 
The master keys are initialised for a TCP by a privileged kernel call which provides the 
address of the other partner as well as the key details. Simultaneously the other partner will 
register the same key details. This will usually be carried out at system initialisation time 
and it is assumed that master key values will change relatively infrequently compared to 
session keys. 
5.2.1.3. Modification of Master Keys 
Master keys can be modified by simply reinitialising them with the same kernel call that is 
used to initialise them, previous information for a given address will be over written. 
5.2.1.4. Master Keys as the trigger for kernel initiated encryption 
It is assumed that encryption may be initiated by either the end user application or the 
kernel. This implies that the default use of encryption is disabled, otherwise, the kernel 
would always initiate encryption, with the end user only overriding certain parameters. The 
"default non encryption" mode of operating also implies that there needs to be a trigger that 
will initiate user transparent encryption between TCP's. This trigger is held with the master 
keys. On initialisation, the master key for a host has a flag set indicating whether encryption 
shall be turned on by default, if this flag is set then appropriate fields will specify the style of 
encryption to be used along with some default initialisation vectors where appropriate. 
5.2.2. Sessions Keys 
Session keys provide the information required to drive the encryption process after session 
establishment. 
5.2.2.1. Purpose of Session Keys 
The purpose of the session key is to provide a unique key that can be shared between 
connected TCP sessions. The keys need to be unique (or at least random) because ultimately 
a socket belongs to a user process that shares an underlying communications transport 
mechanism that can be subject to interception. The association of a unique key with a unique 
socket pair provides the level of security that would be required by applications (as opposed 
to hosts or networks) that exchange secret data. 
5.2.2.2. Storage of Session Keys 
Session keys belong to a particular socket and are valid for the life of that socket. Two 
options are available to store the session keys. The actual socket structure within the kernel 
can be modified to include the key information or an additional structure can be added to 
hold the session keys. The second approach was favored as it reduced the impact and 
recompilation time on the kernel when changes were made to the session key structure. The 
session key structure is linked from the socket structure by a pointer, the memory associated 
with this extended socket arrangement is allocated and deallocated along with the socket 
structure at the appropriate time in the kernel. 
5.2.2.3. Generation of Session Keys 
Session keys can be generated in two ways, the kernel can generate a key or the end user can 
provide an explicit key that it wishes to exchange. 
5.2.2.3.1. Kernel Generated Session Keys 
When required, the kernel will generate keys based on a single internal register and the 
master key of the host to which it will exchange the keys. The register is updated using a 
modulo quadratic hash and this value is passed to the encryption module along with the 
master key of the host, the value returned by this encryption is then used as the session key 
The modulo quadratic hash provides some, but not a lot, of randomness in the generation of 
keys, the randomness and secrecy of the session keys is provided by the encryption of this 
hash by the master key of the host concerned. This reduces the chance that another host, that 
may know the quadratic hash sequence by establishment of some earlier session key, may be 
able to determine the value of a session key for another unauthorised host. 
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Fig #20 - Kernel Generated Session Keys 
5.2.2.3.2. End User Generated Session Keys and Initialisation Vectors 
As well as kernel generated keys, user applications can supply their own session keys. These 
are passed through enhanced kernel calls that are recognized by the security layer and 
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Fig #21 - User Supplied Session Keys 
5.2.3. Key Exchange Mechanisms 
The method of securely exchanging session keys is the most critical aspect of the proposed 
enhancement and requires careful decisions to be made regarding architecture. The general 
mechanism for exchanging keys is presented along with specific means of key exchange. 
In discussing the architecture of key exchange it is assumed that we are actually referring to 
the exchange of encrypted session keys and the process of getting a new session key from 
one host to another is as follows: 
Generate Session Key This is explained above. 
Encrypt the new session key with the appropriate master key. 
Pass the encrypted key to the partner. 
(Partner) decrypt the session key with the master key. 
(Partner) store the session key with the appropriate socket. 
(Both) use the session key to encrypt and decrypt data. 
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Fig #22 - Session Key Processing (SKG - Session Key Generation) 
Several methods of actually conducting the exchange can be used. These are outlined below 
with some discussion of the relative merits of each style. 
5.2.3.1. Using Spare bits in b e TCP header 
As outlined in section 3.4 there are a small number of unused bits within the TCP header 
that may be used to transmit key information. This method of exchanging keys is considered 
undesirable for a number of reasons. Firstly, it contravenes the assumption that this proposal 
will not break an existing implementation of TCP RFC 793 [30] states that reserved bits must 
be zero. Using these bits for another purpose may result in a correct implementation of TCP 
rejecting theses headers. Secondly if this method is used there are only a small number of 
spare bits available in a TCP header, typically six, although up to sixteen additional bits may 
by obtained when the smallest option list (also sixteen bits) is padded to its required thirty 
two bit alignment. This lack of available bits means that when faced with the requirement to 
deliver a sixty four bit or even one hundred and twenty eight bit key multiple headers 
would be required to carry the key payload. Even with the three way handshake used to 
establish a TCP connection it would be difficult to cany moderately large keys without 
substantial revision to the TCP protocol itself. 
5.2.3.2. Inserting Key information instream 
Another method of exchanging encrypted session keys is to embed the keys within the data 
stream using some recognisable escape sequence to detect them. This method would be 
suitable for an out of band key exchange mechanism (which is discussed below) but its goes 
against the general principle of separation of control information and data. This would mean 
that significantly less segregation of functionality could take place between the security layer 
and the TCP layer with one of these layers being responsible for the scanning of incoming 
data streams for possible key sequences and removing them and notifying the other layer of 
its operations. The requirement for one layer of a protocol stack to have intimate knowledge 
of the protocols, formats and operations of another layer largely goes against the general 
design goal of an OSI based protocol stack methodology. 
5.2.3.3. Using an external mechanism 
It is possible that some preexisting mechanism could be used to exchange encrypted session 
keys. This mechanism however, does not solve the problems of keys generation and the 
synchronisation of TCP's and its not in line with the architectural model shown in Fig 19 
5.2.3.4. Using Option Lists 
The final alternative for key exchange that is considered is through the option list 
mechanism. Option lists provide both IP and TCP a method of exchanging small amounts of 
useful non user data information between TCP's or IP based hosts. As seen previously, the 
TCP standard RFC 793 provides for the definition of three recognised option lists. This 
leaves considerable scope for the use of additional option definitions which have not been 
specifically reserved by the standard. Implementations of TCP ignore unrecognised options 
and so the delivery of a non standard option list should not cause a well behaved 
implementation of TCP to fail, merely pass on meaningless data to its application. 
The maximum amount of data that can be delivered through an option list is considerably 
greater that the spare bits provided by the TCP header but not enough to be extravagant will 
key exchange ideas. There is insufficient room to pass both inbound and outbound keys and 
encryption initialisation vectors for algorithms that require one hundred and twenty eight 
bit keys but this can be dealt with as a two way handshake if required. 
As a result of the above, the design decision was taken to use Option Lists as the mechanism 
to exchange keys. 
5.2.3.5. In Band vs Out of Band Key Exchange 
Two approaches can be adopted with the decision as to when it is appropriate to send keys 
between TCP's. Keys may be exchanged in band, that is, at a point in time that is 
synchronised with data transmission, or out of band, that is, a point in time that is not 
synchronised with data flow. 
If an in band approach is used it seems reasonable that the appropriate point in the 
transmission to insert the key exchange is prior to any data being transmitted. The 
disadvantage is that flexibility is lost and the option to either discontinue or modify the 
mode of operation is also not available. It is also difficult to implement an in band scheme 
that uses other than the period prior to data flow to exchange keys without radically altering 
the architecture of TCP. 
The second approach to key exchange is to use an out of band solution. This can present 
potential problems with synchronising data when we are not sure what application layer 
programs above in the protocol stack are doing. Particularly if race conditions develop when 
applications consume data before a key exchange can take place. 
For this final reason an in band key exchange solution adopted with the key exchange being 
executed prior to data transmission. 
5.2.4. Encryption 
The encryption module has two major functions. Firstly to carry out encryption of data 
streams where required and secondly to initiate key exchange and session key generation as 
explained above. 
5.2.4.1. Operation 
As seen previously, application programs that wish to communicate with TCP do so via the 
various network system calls available [socket, connect, read, write, close). Placed between 
these calls and the actual TCP layer is a decision module which will determine if security 
related activity will take place. This is implemented as a flag associated with socket structure 
and will be be set if security is needed otherwise it will not be set. 
If security related activity is to happen read/write calls will be intercepted by the security 
layer and actions taken to encrypt/decrypt data as needed. When these actions are 
completed data is either encrypted and passed down to the TCP layer (for a write type call) 
or decrypted and passed up to the application (for a read type call). 
Also, if security related activity is to happen various socket setup calls will be intercepted 
and action taken to either swap user provided keys or generate and swap kernel generated 
session keys. 
5.2.4.2. Variable Enciyption methods 
Part of the key exchange process involves selecting the encryption scheme to be used during 
encryption operations. 
For maximum flexibility, it is desirable to allow multiple methods of encryption to be 
specified. The type of encryption function to be used as well as its mode of operation is 
coded as a single byte and is passed as part of the key exchange process. The proposed 
enhancement allows for the use of any general purpose encryption scheme, although the 
trial implementation was restricted to block symmetric ciphers modified for stream mode 
operation. The method of encryption is also stored in the extended socket structure along 
with session keys. 
5.3. Comparison with other Proposals 
Several other proposals for security related services within the TCP/IP protocol suite have 
recently emerged. swIPe [19] was mentioned previously as an early investigation that was 
subsequently superseded. While the focus of some of these activities goes beyond the scope 
of this proposal and considerable work is still in progress it is worth reviewing and 
contrasting the very recent work of the lEFT IPSEC Working Group through a number of 
RFC's that have been proposed. 
5.3.1. Introduction to IPSEC 
The lEFT IPSEC Working Group is broadly concerned with issues of authentication and 
privacy over Internet Networks. Some recent RFC's have included: 
• RFC 1825 - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol [5] 
• RFC 1826 - IP Authentication Header [6] 
• RFC 1827 - IP Encapsulating Security Payload [7] 
These will be discussed and compared with the design and implementation proposed above. 
5.3.1.1. RFC 1825 - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol 
RFC 1825 provides for the design of an architecture for security of the IP protocol. It has two 
basic extensions to IP Version 4 and IP Version 6, these are, an authentication scheme and a 
privacy scheme. The aim of the authentication scheme is to provide a host to host or host to 
gateway (or inter-gateway) method of verifying the source of datagrams. The aim of the 
privacy scheme is to provide both authentication and confidentiality of datagrams between 
hosts and gateways. 
Central to RFC 1825 is the concept of the Security Association which includes parameters 
used to establish and maintain security between hosts in a unidirectional fashion. Security 
Associations are linked via a Security Parameter Index (SPI) between hosts. The SPI maps a 
given user/host combination to a Security Association. 
This RFC has design objectives which attempt to minimise the impact of authentication 
schemes and privacy schemes and to provide a range of encryption methods as well as 
internationally acceptable defaults. 
The authentication scheme is known as Authentication Header (AH) and this scheme is 
described more thoroughly in RFC 1826. [6] 
The privacy scheme is known as Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and this scheme is 
described more thoroughly in RFC 1827. [7] 
These two schemes can be used independently or together to provide the implementation of 
a range of security policies. The policies on key management are left open with a number of 
suggestions about automatic key distribution being made. This RFC provides for two 
methods of keying, either host based, where exactly one key per host pair exists or user 
based where multiple keys per host pair exist. The RFC suggests that user based keying be 
available in all implementations. 
5.3.1.2. RFC 1826 - IP Authentication Header 
The IP Authentication scheme known as Authentication Header (AH) works by adding 
authentication data to an IP header. Typically for IP Version 4 this authentication data is 
added between the standard header and the next highest protocol header. 
IP Version 4 Header AH Header Next Highest Protocol 
Fig #23 - IP Version 4 AH Datagram Format 
The AH header has a fixed structure which includes the authentication data. This is 
calculated using a cryptographically strong, one-way function over the entire IP datagram 
replacing, with binary zeros, those fields that routinely change during transmission, (e.g. 
TTL). The requirement to calculate the authentication data over the entire IP datagram 
implies that fragmentation must be completed prior to authentication and special action 
must be taken to deal with IP Option Lists that are modified during transmission. 
On receipt of an authenticated datagram, a host computes the AH header based on the data 
received and an implied zero authentication data area. It then compares this computed AH 
header authentication data with that received in the actual AH header, if the two match then 
the datagram is accepted otherwise it is rejected and the event logged. 
5.3.1.3. RFC 1827 - IP Encapsulating Security Payload 
The IP Privacy scheme, known as Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), works by 
encrypting the data of a payload contained within an IP datagram. Two modes of operating 
are available, in Tunnel mode an entire IP datagram is encrypted and placed within another 
IP datagram (as in the swIPe proposal) using a form of IPIP (IP within IP protocol), in 
Transport mode the ESP header is placed between the IP header and the encrypted transport 
message. ESP IP datagrams are recognised by the assignment of Protocol Number 50 to the 
Protocol field of IPv4 or the Next Header field of IPv6. 
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Fig #24 - ESP Modes of Operation 
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RFC 1825 states that ESP may provide authentication as well as privaq^. If authentication is 
required is must be a byproduct of the encryption process in either Transport or Tunnel 
Mode. By default, RFC 1827 must support DES-CBC for the encryption of messages, this by 
itself will not provide any authentication or non-repudiation properties but the RFC allows 
for the implementation of schemes that do. 
Operation of both modes is straight forward, on receipt of a Tunnel Mode datagram the host 
will find the Security Association required for this datagram and use it to decrypt the entire 
IP datagram that has been "tunneled", this IP datagram is now passed back to the IP stack for 
processing. In Transport mode, the host will find the Security Association required for the 
message and decrypt the message associated with the next highest transport protocol. When 
decrypted the message is passed to the next highest layer in the protocol stack. In both cases 
any errors in decryption or authentication will cause the datagram to be dropped and the 
error event recorded. 
5.3.2. Comparison between the proposed enhancement and IPSEC 
Several major differences are apparent between the work of the lEFT IPSEC and this 
proposal. These will be discussed along with some recent associated criticism of the lEFT 
IPSEC approach. 
5.3.2.1. TCP vs IP level encryption 
The major difference between lEFT IPSEC and this proposal is the point in the protocol stack 
where the functionality is provided. The lEFT IPSEC RFC's concentrate entirely on the IP 
protocol whereas this proposal really lies above the TCP protocol as depicted in Fig #18. 
There are some disadvantages in placing security extensions in both of these areas however 
interfering with the IP protocol seems to be more disruptive since: 
• it requires that all hosts and gateways be able to process AH or ESP datagrams. This 
may pose some backward compatibility problems since it would be impossible to 
retrospectively mandate this functionality for IPv4. 
• by its nature it has to be mandated for the IPv6 protocol which will cause increasing 
complexity at this level of the network layer. 
• it seriously limits the ability of gateways and routers to deal with upper layers of the 
protocol stack unless significant relaxation of privacy and authentication requirements 
are allowed. This is against the whole thrust of the approach. 
• it mandates the use of the features prescribed regardless of the upper level protocol. UDP 
and TCP are both affected by IPSEC when it may or may not be appropriate to do so, 
particularly with UDP which may be used by applications (like Secure NFS) that have 
their own security mechanisms. 
On the other hand using the point just above TCP in the protocol stack (as proposed) has its 
own disadvantages: 
• it offers no security to any headers. The proposal as outlined, only protects the data 
portion of the transport layer message, ESP in Tunnel Mode secures (and potentially 
authenticates) the entire IP datagram. 
• it is limited in application to TCP based applications. It may happen that in future 
protocols are developed with different design objectives to TCP, these will not be able to 
avail themselves of this proposal. 
Whereas UDP is somewhat a degenerate form of TCP, future protocols may not be and 
may include such features as class of service, real time response combined with more 
tradition features like connection oriented communication that are seen in TCP. Any new 
protocol could run in a secured environment under IPSEC but not under the proposed 
solution. 
These are also some advantages in using a point above TCP over IP. 
• it is conceptually easier to implement streams ciphers and other schemes that require 
reliable connection oriented services. IP by its very nature can loose datagrams and this 
makes using scheme that maintain state information based on previously received data 
more difficult to implement. 
• it is conceptually easier to implement a new layer in the protocol stack than augment an 
existing one. This proposal forms a new layer which although interacting with TCP is 
largely decoupled from it. This was not possible for the IPSEC group and led to obvious 
problems such as dealing with fragmentation and changing option lists. 
• the security mechanism is closer to the application and in some sense spends less time in 
an unencrypted format. This may be relevant when facilities such as TCP message 
tracing are available on systems using IPSEC thus allowing the viewing of clear text 
messages at a level between the application and the security mechanism. 
On these arguments TCP was selected as an appropriate place to put a new security layer. 
5.3.2.2. Privacy 
The entire thrust of the proposal outlined here is privacy of transport level data. While this is 
one objective of the lEFT IPSEC RFC's there are many others including authentication and 
variable modes of operation. Rogaway [32] has obliquely criticised the complexity of the 
IPSEC model of ESP stating that it should be restricted to only privacy issues and that 
authentication and integrity should be placed elsewhere. This is precisely the thrust of the 
proposed enhancement which architecturally provides one simple mode of operation which 
gives privacy to the data associated with a connection oriented message passing protocol. 
Rogaway [32] also recommends a mode of operation that includes the efficient use of 
encrypting hardware, this proposal allows for such a mode of operation. 
5.3.2.3. Authentication 
The lEFT IPSEC group RFC's provide for authentication. As stated above this proposal does 
not address the issue of authentication, although, as with ESP, it would be possible to 
implement an authentication scheme based around the encrypting and decrypting functions 
which was beyond the actual functionality of the proposal itself. 
5.3.2.4. Master Key Exchange 
Both lEFT IPSEC and this proposal defer the issue of key management. Both use a default 
manual method of key dissemination but both would benefit from the implementation of 
protocols such as ISAKMP [29], Photuris [24], CDP [1], SKIP [2] and variants [3,4]. 
5.3.2.5. Bandwidth considerations 
Both the lEFT IPSEC proposal and the proposal set out here have considerable 
computational implications because encryption of streams of data are involved. The lEFT 
IPSEC RFC's repeatedly mention the latency impact that encryption and decryption of IP 
datagrams will have. The proposed enhancement implemented below will also be shown to 
have significant impact on throughput and communication latency. This is not surprising 
given the nature of encryption. The impact of encryption and decryption can however be 
mitigated by the use of efficient hardware assisting in the encryption and decryption [32]. 
With the lEFT IPSEC RFC's, another latency effect can be observed due to the increasing size 
of IP datagram packets. Each IP datagram sent between hosts or gateways carries an either 
an ESP header or another entire IP datagram header (in the case of ESP) or an AH header (in 
the case of AH). Given that IP traffic tends to be either very large packets or very small 
packets, this overhead on every IP packet could be significant in a constrained bandwidth 
network. 
Compared to this, the proposed enhancement provides a fixed size, one off exchange of data 
on a per session basis making it potentially more efficient in a constrained network 
bandwidth environment. 
6. Implementation 
The enhanced functionality to be provided is now described. This involves the modification 
to the formats of TCP option lists and the addition of data structures and code modules to 
interpret and act on the new formats defined. 
The purpose of the enhanced functionality is to provide a method of encrypting the data 
associated with messages passed between TCPs. 
The extent of the encryption is the data portion of the TCP message and the encryption of 
keys passed between TCPs at session establishment time. 
To allow the use of stream oriented ciphers, the problem of dealing with urgent data is 
ignored. When urgent data is sent or received it is simply passed in clear text between TCPs. 
This simplifies the implementation and it could be argued improves security since most 
urgent data are typically well known escape sequences that may provide clues to a 
cryptanalyst using a known ciphertext attack. 
The enhanced functions provided are implemented in two parts. Firstly additional data 
structures are added to the kernel and secondly additional code to provide control and 
encryption schemes within the kernel. 
6.1. Data Structures 
Two additional data structures have been added to the kernel. 
The crypt_proto structure provides the linkage and state information for individual sock 
structures within the kernel. Each sock structure has two cryptjjroto structures associated 
with it, one is for the sending stream, one is for the incoming stream. 
The fields within this structure hold pointers to the encryption/decryption functions. These 
are initialised from a global cryptjjroto array structure called the crypt_register in 
linux/net/inet/tcp_crypt.c or as a result of ioctl commands or arriving TCP options. 
The key and iv fields provide a storage area for user supplied initialisation parameters. The 
encryption specific fields lokijits, lokikeys, desjits, ks, ksjriple, bitsjriple, bits and sapphire 
provide a place for encryption schemes to hold state information, similarly state and estate 
allow the protocol handler routines to hold general state information. The protocol field 
holds the numeric value of the current protocol in operation and is linked to the symbolic 
names defined in linux/net/inet/tcp_crypt.h. 
struct crypt_proto { 
void (*encryptor)(struct crYpt_proto *pcp,unsigned char *,int len); 
void {*decrYptor)(struct crypt_proto *pcp,unsigned char *,int len); 
unsigned long key[2]; 
unsigned long iv[2]; 
unsigned long bits[2]; 
unsigned char loki_bits[8]; 
unsigned long lokikeys[ROUNDS]; 
unsigned char des_bits[8]; 
des_key_schedule ks; 
des_key_schedule ks_triple; 
unsigned long bits_triple[2]; 





Fig #25 - The crypt_proto structure 
The host2host_encrypt structure holds a record for remote hosts where kernel initiated 
encryption will take place. 
The status field indicates whether this particular record is free, active or deleted. The address 
is the IP address in network byte order binary. The protocol_out field indicates the presence of 
an outgoing encryption scheme for this address. The masterJ^ey is used to encrypt the option 
fields as they are passed between hosts during session establishment. The default_key and 
default Jv fields provide for known starting points for schemes that require them. 
The last three fields provide the same information as the previous three but for the incoming 
schemes. 
The global array holding the host2host_encrypt structures is called tcp_encryptJiost2host and is 
located in linux/net/inet/tcp_crypt.c. 
struct host2host_encrypt { 
int status; 
unsigned long address; 
int protocol_out; 
unsigned long master_key_out[2]; 
unsigned long default_key_out[2] ; 
unsigned long default_iv_out[2]; 
int protocol_in; 
unsigned long master_key_in[2]; 
unsigned long default_key_in[2]; 
unsigned long default_iv_in[2]; 
} ; 
Fig #26 - The host2host_encrypt structure 
6.2. Modes of operation 
To allow maximum flexibility in operation, three modes of encryption are available. The first 
is "program initiated and controlled host to host encryption" where a client and server 
program initiate and control the operation of underlying kernel services. The next is 
"program initiated, kernel controlled encryption" where one side of a client/server program 
pair will initiate encryption but the kernel will then negotiate operation and control without 
need for further intervention by the other client/server. The final mode of operation is 
"kernel initiated and controlled encryption" where the kernel will automatically initiate 
encryption services between hosts without the need for client/server knowledge or 
intervention. 
6.2.1. Program initiated and controlled operation 
This mode of operation allows applications to control all aspects of encryption. It is suitable 
when developers wish to specifically enforce patterns of usage and are prepared to control 
aspects of operation including key distribution and initialisation of encryption services. This 
mode of operation represents an enhancement to the socket implementations typical of 
UNIX environments but does not represent a change to the architecture of TCP itself since 
the underlying formats and protocols have not altered. 
Program initiated and controlled operation works by introducing six new ioctl commands to 
the socket interface. When invoked they cause the kernel to take actions that enable and 
disable encryption services, set keys and set initial encryption vectors (where relevant) for 
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Fig #27 - Program Initiated and Controlled Operation 
6.2.1.1. loctl's for program initiated and controlled operation 
The SIOCSICRYPTP command (Socket lOCtl Set Incoming CRYPT Protocol) takes as an 
argument the required underlying encryption scheme number that has been defined in the 
<sockios.h> include file. It uses this number to locate the associated crypt_proto structure 
associated with the desired encryption scheme. The kernel sets the receiving crypt protocol 
structure to be a copy of the global crypt_proto structure. Should the argument be out of 
range then an error is returned. 
if ( i o c t K s o c k , SIOCSICRYPTP ,TCP_CRyPT_CFB) != 0 ) { 
fprintf(stderr,"SIOCSCRYPTP - Not supportedXn"); 
exit(-1); 
} 
Fig #28 - A typical code fragment ioctl setting the Encryption Scheme. 
The SIOCSOCRYPTP command (Socket lOCtl Set Outgoing CRYPT Protocol) takes as an 
argument the required underlying encryption scheme number that has been defined in the 
<sockios.h> include file. It uses this number to locate the associated crypt_proto structure 
associated with the desired encryption scheme. The kernel sets the sending crypt protocol 
structure to be a copy of the global crypt_proto structure. Should the argument be out of 
range then an error is returned. In operation the kernel immediately commences the 
encryption scheme chosen as soon as the next read or write operation is performed. 
The SIOCSICKEY command (Socket lOCtl Set Incoming Crypt KEY] takes as an argument a 
pointer to an array of unsigned longs which are used to initialise the cipher key for the 
incoming socket. Depending on the encryption scheme being utilised this call may be used 
or ignored. With the DES scheme in ECB mode and the Loki scheme an optimised key 
schedule is generated prior to the first read or write and calls to this command are processed 
but have no effect unless done before reading and/or writing are started. Other schemes 
may allow dynamic key changes to be catered for. The specifics of this call depend on the 
implementation of the scheme. 
The SIOCSOCKEY command (Socket lOCtl Set Outgoing Crypt KEY) is analogous to the 
SIOCSICKEY command. 
unsigned long key[2]; /* DES Key 64 bits */ 
key[0] = Oxfefefefe; /* Weak keys */ 
key[1] = Oxfefefefe; 
if ( ioctKsock, SIOCSICKEY ,key) != 0 ) { 
fprintf(stderr/'SIOCSCKEY - FailureXn"); 
exit(-1); 
} 
Fig #29 - A typical code fragment ioctl setting the Encryption Key. 
The SIOCSICIV command (Socket lOCtl Set Incoming Initial Vector) takes as an argument a 
pointer to an array of unsigned longs which are used to initialise an input vector that can be 
used as a starting point for an enciphering scheme. Calls to this function are most effective if 
done prior to reading and writing since the implementation of the operation can effect when 
an initial vector is used and what the effect of updating an existing vector will be. The initial 
vector can be considered a kind of salt used by the encryption schemes when required. 
The SIOCSOCIV command (Socket lOCtl Set Outgoing Initial Vector) is analogous to the 
SIOCSICIV command except that it applies to the sending stream of a socket. 
unsigned long iv[2]; 
iv[0] = 0x12345678; 
iv[1] = 0x87654321; 
if ( ioctl(sock, SIOCSICIV ,iv) != 0 ) { 
fprintf(stderr/'SIOCSCIV - Failure\n"); 
exit(-1); 
} 
Fig #30 - A typical code fragment ioctl setting the Initial Vector. 
6.2.2. Program initiated, kernel controlled operation 
In program initiated, host controlled mode, one of the client server pair initialises keys, 
vectors and encryption schemes prior to the connect or accept calls. At connection time the 
keys and initial vectors are exchanged via addition TCP Option fields and encryption is 
commenced without the other partner program being aware. 
6.2.2.1. Client Initiated Encryption 
When a client program wishes to initiate encryption without involvement of the associated 
server program it sets up encryption schemes and initial vectors and keys for either or both 
of the incoming or outgoing streams using the same ioctl's as program initiated and 
controlled case. Prior to the connect it then issues ioctl's to activate the exchange of 













Fig #31 - Client Initiated Encryption 
Two ioctl commands are used to activate this exchange. The SIOCSIP command indicates 
that the client wishes to exchange key and IV information on its incoming stream. The 
SIOCSOP command indicates that the client wishes to exchange key and IV information on 
its outgoing stream. 
On receiving one of these ioctl's the kernel winds its way through to tcpjoctl in 
linux/net/inet/tcp.c where it sets a bit in the sending stream's state variable so that the 
subsequent call to connect can take additional action. 
The state variable that is held within the sending streams cryptjjroto structure acts for both 
sending and receiving streams. This variable is treated as a set of bits that are set following 
calls to ioctl with the SIOCSIP and and SIOCSOP commands. The least significant bit is set 
following a SIOCSIP and the next significant bit is set following a SIOCSOP. 
MSB LSB 
crypt_proto.state 1/0 1/0 
send Incoming key/IV 
send Outgoing key/IV 
Fig #32 - State information bits within crypt_proto 
On the subsequent call to connect TCP enters its usual three way handshake with the client 
sending a SYN segment from tcpjconnect in linux/net/inet/tcp.c. This segment contains an 
addition option field depending on values held in the sending crypt_proto structure's state 
variable. 
If the Incoming Key/IV bit is set and the Outgoing Key/IV is not then the kernel builds a 
TCPOPT_SRS option field with the following format. 
16 24 32 





Fig #33 - The TCPOPT_SRS Option field format 
The first byte is the option number (99) and indicates that this option field contains the key 
and initial vector of the connecting client's receiving stream. This is subsequently used to 
initialise the sending steam of the server's associated socket. The second byte contains the 
length of the option field (20) as specified in the TCP standard. The third field contains the 
encryption scheme number that is being used and represents an offset into the global 
crypt_register. The fourth byte is padding and contains zero. The next two 32 bit words 
contain the 64 bit initial vector. The final two 32 bit words contain a 64 bit key Both of the IV 
and Key fields are encrypted with a master key that is shared between hosts. 
If the Outgoing key/IV bit is set and the Incoming/IV bits is not set then the kernel build a 
TCPOPT_SSS option field with a format similar to a TCPOPT_SRS option field with the 
exception that the encrypted IV and key fields belong to the client's sending stream. 
16 24 32 





Fig #34 - The TCPOPT_SSS Option field format 
Should both bits be set then a TCPOPT_SBS option field is built with the following structure. 
16 24 32 









Fig #35 - The TCPOPT_SBS Option field format 
The schemcin, ^ i n and Keyin are associated with the client's incoming stream and the 
schemeout/ '̂̂ out and Keyout are associated with the client's outgoing stream. 
Having constructed this segment the client's kernel now sends it to the server's kernel. 
Following receipt of this segment the server winds up in tcp_rcv in linux/net/inet/tcp.c 
where it will process the connection request through the routine tcp_conn_request also in 
linux/net/inet/tcp.c. tcp_conn_request calls tcp_option in linux/net/inet/tcp.c where the 
option fields are decoded and the appropriate encryption schemes, keys and initial vectors 
are established in the server's crypt structures. Thus the encryption mechanism is 
established without the intervention of the server program itself. 
6.2.2.2. Server Initiated Encryption 
When the server wishes to initiate encryption it establishes encryption schemes, keys and the 
initial vector as in the program initiated and controlled case. It then calls the SIOCSIP 
and/or SIOCSOP ioctl commands prior to accept. This causes the kernel to build one of the 
option fields described above and sent it as part of it actions in tcp_conn_request. The client's 
kernel receives this segment as part of the session setup handshake process when moving 
from SYN_SENT to ESTABLISHED. The client's kernel will receive the segment in tcpjrcv 
and make its way to setting the socket state as ESTABLISHED and calling tcp_option. As in 
tcp_conn_request the options are decoded and the appropriate schemes, keys and initial 












Fig #36 - Server Initiated Encryption 
6.2.3. Kernel initiated and controlled operation 
To enable a kernel to initiate and control encryption a global table is established and 
maintained to hold information about pairs of hosts that will automatically pass encrypted 
messages when sessions are established. This global table is called tcp_encryptJiost2host and 
is located in linux/net/inet/tcp_encrypt.c. It contains fields for destinations, schemes and 
default key/initial vector values. The table is initialised by a special SIOCSMLSUA (Socket 
lOCtl Set Multiple Link Secure User Access) ioctl command which copies values into the next 
available slot in the global table. Typically this call is made by a specialised program that is 
run as part of the systems initialisation phase. 
When sessions are established the kernel checks in tcpjconnect and tcp_conn_request to see if 
the destination address appears in the global encryption table. If a destination is found, the 
socket's crypt state is modified prior to the building of the segment option lists and normal 
processing exchanges encryption details as in the case of program initiated-host controlled 
encryption and then encrypted data transfer can take place. 
Key/IV session setup Key/IV 
tcp_encrypt Encrypted Data tcp_encrypt 
kernel kernel 
Fig #37 - Kernel Initiated Encryption 








Set Incoming CRYPT Protocol 
Set Outgoing CRYPT Protocol 
Set Incoming Crypt Initial Vector 
Set Outgoing Crypt Initial Vector 
Set Incoming Protocol 
Set Outgoing Protocol 
Set Multiple Link Secure User Access 
Summary of TCP Options 
Option Name Function Opt# Length 
TCPOPT_SRS Secure Receiving Stream 99 20 
TCPOPT_SSS Secure Sending Stream 98 20 
TCPOPT_SRS Secure Both Streams 97 36 
6.3. Operation of the Encryption routines 
All calls to encrypt/decrypt data as it passes to and from user address space are channelled 
through the tcp_encrypt and tcp_decrypt routines in linux/net/inet/tcp_crypt.c. Within 
tcp_crypt.c a structure called a crypt_register has been defined which carries the set of 
functions used for encrypting and decrypting by the various protocols. A new structure has 
been added to the sock structure called a crypt protocol block which is initialised with 
pointers to specific functions associated with cryptographic operations as well as sufficient 
state information to run the necessary routines. A crypt protocol structure is associated with 
inbound and outbound data. 
The basic routine to encrypt data is called tcp_encrypt and takes as arguments the socket's 
crypt protocol structure, a buffer to be encrypted and the length of the buffer. It checks to 
ensure that the encryptor function associated with the crypt protocol structure is not NULL 
and then calls this function with the same arguments that were passed to it. 
The decryptor routine tcp_decrypt works the same way as tcp_encrypt except that it calls the 
decryptor protocol function instead of the encryptor. 
Several encryptor/decryptor protocol function exist. These are discussed below. 
6.3.1. NULL 
The first function, which holds position zero in the crypt_register, is the NULL function. This 
allows the system to select a known value as a default and reduce calling overhead from 
tcp_encrypt and tcp_decrypt. 
6.3.2. tcp_nop_enc 
The tcp_nop_enc routine is a no operation encryptor/decryptor. It takes arguments from 
tcp_encrypt or tcp_decrypt and returns without making any modifications to the buffer 
passed. Since it is a no operation function tcp_nop_enc is used for both encryption and 
decryption. 
6.3.3. tcp_non_enc 
The tcp_non_enc function provides a simple Vigenere cipher scheme for encrypting streams. 
The key is made up of eight bytes from the user's supplied key The "non" in tcp_non_enc 
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Fig #38 - Vigenere Cipher Scheme 
6.3.4. tcp_des_cfb_enc & tcp_des_cfb_dec 
The tcp_des_cfb_enc routine uses a form of DES encryption in cipher feedback mode. The 
tcp_des_cfb_enc first checks to see if it is in an initial state and if so generates an optimised 
key schedule which is saved in the crypt protocol block for future use. The routine then 
makes a direct call to the underlying des_cfb_encrypt routine in the deslib library, passing the 
buffer to be encrypted as both input and output, the previously generated key schedule, a 
cipher feedback block to hold intermediate results used by subsequent calls to this function 
and a mode of operation, which in this case is DES_ENCRYPT. 
The tcp_desc_cfb_dec routine is analogous to tcp_desc_cfb_enc except that the mode of 
operation of des_cfb_encrypt is DES_DECRYPT. 
In both cases the output buffer is encrypted/decrypted in place and passed directly back to 
the calling routine. 
tcp_des_cfb_enc 
Fig #39 - DES Cipher Feedback Mode 
6.3.5. tcp_des_ecbe 
The tcp_des_ecbe routine uses DES in electronic codebook mode to generate "random" bit 
patterns that are XOR'ed with the output stream one byte at a time. The socket protocol 
encryption data structure holds these bits patterns eight bytes at a time and uses them on the 
input stream as required. When a new set of bits is required the previous set of bytes is used 
as input to DES with the original key giving a new set of bytes to XOR into the outout 
stream. In this way the input and ciphering mechanism are totally segregated. 
IV (64 bits) 
Plaintext Input 
DES in ECB Mode Key (64 bits) 
64 Bits 
e 
One Byte at a time 
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Fig #40 - DES Electronic Codebook Mode 
6.3.6. tcp_enloki 
The tcpjmloki routine operates in the same fashion as DES in electronic codebook mode. 
Fig #41 - Loki Mode of Operation 
6.3.7. tcp_des_3ecb 
The Triple DES version of the DES routine functions in the same way as the single mode DES 
function. The exception being that the two keys required come from both the 64 bit user key 
supplied with the SIOSCIKEY ioctl as well as the 64 bit initial vector supplied with the 
SIOSCIV ioctl or their respective equivalent outgoing or host to host default values. 
6.3.8. tcp_des_3cbc 
The Triple DES version of the cipher feedback mode of operation works in the same manner 
as the single mode DES cipher feedback mode with the same exceptions as the tcp_des_3ech 
operation above. 
6.3.9. sapphire_enc and tcp_sapphire_dec 
The sapphire_enc and tcp_sapphire_dec routines operate using a sapphire structure held within 
each crypt_proto structure. The sapphire structure and its associated user key are initialised 
prior to the first byte of an output/input stream being encrypted/decrypted. The key is 
made up of 32 bytes formed by the key and initial vector supplied by the SIOCSIKEY and 
SIOCSIV ioctl's of their respective equivalent outgoing or host to host default values. 
Plaintext ciphertext 
Fig #42 - Sapphire Mode of Operation 
Summary of Supported Encryption Schemes 
Symbolic Name Description Encyptor Decryptor 
TCP_CRYPT_NUL Place holder NULL NULL 
TCP_CRYPT_NOP Encrypt with nop tcp_nop_enc tcp_nop_enc 
TCP_CRYPT_NON Nonsence encryption scheme tcp_non_enc tcp_non_enc 
TCP_CRYPT_CFB DES Cipher Feedback mode tcp_des_cfb_enc tcp_des_cfb_dec 
TCP_CRYPT_DES DES Electronic Codebook Mode tcp_des_ecbe tcp_des_ecbe 
TCP_CRYPT_LOK Loki 91 tcp_enloki tcp_enloki 
TCP_CRYPT_TRI Triple-DES ECB tcp_des_3ecb tcp_des_3ecb 
TCP_CRYPT_TRF Triple-DES CBC tcp_des_3cbc tcp_des_3cbc 
TCP_CRYPT_SAP Sapphire tcp_sapphire_enc tcp_sapphire_dec 
6.4. Adding a scheme 
The process of adding a new encryption scheme to the Linux kernel involves adding new 
definitions and code to the modules within the TCP implementation of the system. After 
some preliminary work adding a new scheme is relatively straightforward. The steps 
required are outlined below. 
6.4.1. Review 
An initial review of the source code containing the proposed new scheme is required. This 
serves two purposes. The first is to satisfy oneself, at least superficially the scheme in 
question is actually a valid scheme and not some "trojan horse" that is being offered as a 
valid encryption method. Secondly the review should ensure that no global variables or 
other "kernel unfriendly" programming practices are evident. During the implementations 
described above a commonly available version of FEAL was rejected after the initial review 
and LOKI91 was adjusted to deal with the presence of some static data. The implementation 
of Sapphire, which was originally translated from Object Oriented Pascal [15], was written 
so that no static data was needed. 
Having reviewed the source code, an object file should be created along with an appropriate 
header file (.h) providing the required global prototype declarations. 
The changes required within the Linux code can then largely be confined to tcp_encrypt.h, 
tcp_encrypt.c, tcp.c within the l inux/net/ inet directory and a few Makefiles. 
6.4.2. tcp_crypt.h 
This header file provides the definitions and structures required by the rest of the kernel to 
implement the prototype encryption schemes as defined in the crypt_register structure. 
Each encryption scheme has a scheme number defined and for each scheme an additional 
#define is required. These names serve as a symbol for the position in the crypt_register 
structure of the new scheme. When adding a new scheme the MAX_CRYPT_PROTOCOL 
constant also needs to be updated to reflect the new schemes appearance. Finally any new 
structures required for the new scheme need to be added to the crypt_proto structure. This 
will then flow through to the definition of a socket that will carry the new definitions at run 
time. 
6.4.3. tcpjorypt.c 
This file contains the routines that transform call and parameters from the canonical format 
used within tcp.c to the specific calls and parameters used by individual schemes. 
When adding a new scheme, two new routines are mandatory. These are the encryptor and 
the decryptor. Pointers to these routines are inserted into the crypt_register array at an offset 
consistent with the symbolic names in crypt_register. 
The format of the prototype parameter in these routines must conform to the existing 
routines in the crypt jregister. i.e. 
void encryptor{stnict crypt_proto *pcp, unsigned char *p, int len); 
and 
void decryptor[stnic± crypt_proto *pcp, unsigned char *p, int len); 
In general these routines will consist of two parts. The first part will be the initialisation of 
the crypt scheme (if required) and the second part will deal with the byte to byte encryption 
or decryption of user data. These routines are free to make calls on the underlying 
subroutines implementing the scheme in question. 
6.4.4. MakefUes 
The location and dependencies of any new source code files needs to be placed in one or 
more of the kernel's Makefiles. With this done the kernel can now be regenerated in the 
standard way. 
7. Results 
To gauge the overhead of adding secure TCP services to the Linux kernel a series of tests 
were run with measurements taken to evaluate the overhead. 
It should be noted at the outset that the results provided below do not represent a 
comparison between the schemes presented. None of the encryption schemes was optimised 
in any way for the hardware involved. In particular all routines were portable C language 
implementations with no assembly language or other low level support. 
The tests consisted of three programs and one well known application. 
The three programs were: a client, a server and a control program. These were run to provide 
explicit timings reported below. 
The client and server program are similar to those described in Section 4.2 with the exception 
that a variable (parameter driven) amount of data could be generated and an arbitrary host 
could be specified by the client to allow the server to run on a remote machine. 
The control program simply provided a user interface to the SIOCSMLSUA ioctl call 
allowing various parameters to be set in the kernel. 
The tests consisted of using the control program (called siocstnlsua) to set up the required 
encryption scheme, then invoking the server in background with a specified amount of data 
to deliver. The client would then be invoked and would read data until an end of file 
condition was reached. The client then reports on the frequency distribution of binary data 
recieved. 
The server program typically would send one kilobyte blocks of ASCII character "A". The 
client should then produce a frequency distribution consisting of 100% 'A"'s. 
Both local only operations, where the client and server run on the same machine and host to 
host remote operation were tested. The local host was used to test the validity of the 
client/server programs as well as eliminate the possible effects of network transmission 
bottlenecks. The disadvantage of the local host test was that the client/server programs were 
competing against each other for CPU cycles in all cases. 
The host to host tests were run between two similarly configured computers over a 
10Mb/sec ethemet connection. At the time of the test these two machines were isolated on a 
single ethemet segment with no other devices or traffic present. No other applications of 
significance were running when these tests were in progress. 
The application test involved using the control program to set up host to host encryption 
schemes and then using the ftp(l) program to transfer relatively modest amounts of data 
between hosts. 
7.1. Observations 
As would be expected for such simple applications, the majority of CPU time when running 
these tests was spent in the Linux kernel. In the local host case all CPU cycles were 
consumed on all tests, with little or no idle time. The more complex encryption schemes cost 
more to run and the subroutine linkage overhead was minimal. 
On the host to host tests it was observed that both client consumed about 70% of available 
CPU cycles on most tests and network bandwidth was not as much of an issue as simple 
network latency. The server on the other hand used only 30% of CPU cycles when no real 
encryption scheme was active. This quickly rose to 100% of CPU cycles when serious 
encryption was utilised. This reinforces the conclusion that CPU cycles, not network 
bandwidth, was the limiting performance factor in these tests. The actual split of 
applications across two machines in this distributed fashion accounts for the reduced 
elapsed time in all tests when comparing local and remote execution. 
The poor performance of LOKl was a surprise. However the version of DES used did 
generate an optimised key schedule that was saved between successive calls. 
When using the ftp program to a remote host transfer speeds of around 600KB/ sec were 
observed when no encryption scheme was in use. The rate dropped to around 30KB/sec 
when the most expensive schemes were employed. 
The table below shows various times for client server program execution for a reasonable 
data transfer for both locally and remotely run program for all implemented schemes. 
Sending 5 Mbyte of encry pted data 
Transmission Local Host Over Ethernet 
Sec. Elapsed CPU Elapsed CPU 
Protocol Server Client Server Client Server Client Server Client 
NULL 20 20 15 4 8 8 3 7 
NOP 31 30 15 4 10 10 4 7 
NON 39 38 7 20 18 18 8 8 
DESCFB 341 340 169 159 164 163 163 120 
DESECB 87 86 43 32 38 37 36 26 
LOKI 3677 3676 1837 1825 1833 1832 1829 1367 
DES3ECB 169 168 84 74 78 78 77 55 
DES3CFB 150 148 76 66 69 68 68 47 
SAPPHIRE 97 95 47 34 42 42 41 28 
8. Conclusion 
An extension to the implementation of TCP under Linux has been described. This extension 
allows program controlled and kernel controlled invocation of encryption schemes between 
cooperating socket based programs. The architecture of TCP has remained intact, with 
additional option fields within TCP headers being used to pass encryption setup information 
between TCPs. The implementation of TCP has been modified by the addition of ioctl 
commands to achieve the necessary setup and control of encryption schemes. Performance 
measures showed a significant overhead can be associated with certain encryption methods. 
8.1. Future work 
The use of specific encryption hardware to speed up the encryption process may go some 
way to alleviating the overhead of encryption. Additional work is required to automate the 
secure delivery of master keys by incorporating some existing system (i.e. Kerberos) into 
control programs such as siocsmlsua. 
9. Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Mr Ian Crakanthorp of the ANSTO Computing Centre, Lucas Heights 
Research Laboratories, for alerting me to the existence of Linux and for the painstaking task 
of keeping up with the early releases of Version 0.99b during 1993. 
10. References 
[1] Ashar A., Markson T., PrafuUchandra H., 1995, Certificate Discovery Protocol lEFT 
IPSEC WG - draft-ieft-ipsec-cdp-OO.txt. 
[2] Ashar A., Markson T., Prafullchandra H., 1995, Simple Key-Management For Internet 
Protocol (SKIP), lEFTIPSEC WG - draft-ieft-ipsec-skip-06.txt. 
[3] Ashar A., Markson T., Prafullchandra H., 1995, SKIP Algorithm Discovery Protocol 
lEFTIPSEC WG - draft-ieft-ipsec-skip-ado-OO.txt. 
[4] Ashar A, Markson T., Prafullchandra H., 1995, SKIP Extensions for IP Multicast lEFT 
IPSEC WG - draft-ieft-ipsec-skip-mc-OOJxt. 
[5] Atkinson R., 1995, RFC 1825 - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol. lEFT 
IPSEC NWG 
[6] Atkinson R., 1995, RFC 1826 - IP Authentication Header. lEFTIPSEC NWG 
[7] Atkinson R., 1995, RFC 1827 - IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). lEFT IPSEC 
NWG 
[81 Balenson D., 1989, RFC 1423 - Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part 
III - Algorithms, Modes and IdentifiersJAE IRTFPSRG, IETF PEM WG 
[9] Billsf, 1994, Hitchhikers guide to the phone system. Phreaking in the nineties, 
alt.security 
[10] Bishop M., 1990, A Security Analysis of the NTP Protocol, Report to the PSRG, 
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Dartmouth College Hanover, NH 03755 
[11] Braden R., 1989, RFC1122 - Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Communication Layers, 
Network Working Group - Internet Engineering Task Force 
[12] Brown L., Jaatun M.G., 1991, Telnet Authentication: Challenge-Response, Internet-Draft 
Network Working Group 
[13] Brown L., Jaatun M.G., 1991, Telnet Data Encryption Option, Internet-Draft Network 
Working Group 
[14] Brown L., Jaatun M.G., 1992, Secure FTP Using Telnet Options, Internet-Draft Network 
Working Group 
[15] Comer D.E., 1991, Internetworking with TCP/IP. Vol I: Principles, Protocols, and 
Architecture, Prentice Hall, Inc., ISBN 0-13-468505-9 
[16] Comer D.E., Stevens D.L, 1991, Internetworking with TCP/IP Vol II: Design, 
Implementation, and Internals Prentice Hall, Inc., ISBN 0-13-472242-6 
[17] Comer D.E., Stevens D.L., 1993, Internetworking with TCP/IP Vol III: Client - Server 
Programming and Applications BSD Socket Version Prentice Hall, Inc., ISBN 
0-13-474222-2 
[18] loannidis J., Blaze M., 1993, The Architecture and Implementation of Network-Layer 
Security Under Unix, Fourth Usenix Security Symposium Proceedings, Usenix 
[19] loannidis ]., Blaze M., 1993, The swIPe IP Security Protocol, INTERNETDRAFTIEFT 
[20] Intel, 1986, 80386 Programmer's Reference Manual, Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, CA 
95051, ISBN 1-55512-022-9 
[21] Johnson M.R, 1994, RC4 short cycles with period of 65280 bytes!, sci.crypt.research. Date 
16 Nov 1994 04:07:12 GMT 
[22] Johnson M.R, 1994, The Sapphire Stream Cipher, sci.crypt.research. Date 10 Dec 1994 
00:41:39 GMT 
[23] Kaliski B., 1993, RFC 1424 - Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: 
Key Certification and Related Services, RSA Laboratories 
[24] Kam P., Simpson W.A., The Photuris Seesion Key Management Protocol. lEFT IPSEC 
WG, draft-ieft-ipsec-photuris-08. txt 
[25] Kent S., 1993, RFC 1422 - Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II: 
Certificate-Based Key Management, lAB IRTFPSRG, IETF PEM 
[26] Lacy J.B., Mitchell D.P., Schell W.M., 1993, CryptoLib: Cryptography in Software, UNIX 
Security Symposium IV Proceedings - USENIX 
[27] Leffler S J , McKusick M.K., Karels M.J, Quarterman J.S, 1989, The Design and 
Implementation of the 4.3BSD Unix ® Operating System, Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, ISBN 0-201-06196-1 
[28] Linn J , 1993, RFC 1421 - Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: 
Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures. lAB IRTFPSRG, IETF PEM WG 
[29] Maughan D., Scherlter M., 1995, Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol (ISAKMP). lEFTIPSEC WG - draft-ieft-ipsec-isakmp-03.txt 
[30] Postel J., 1981, RFC 793 - Transmission Control Protocol, DARPA Internet Program 
Protocol Specification. Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency Information Processing 
Techniques Office 
[31] Ranum M.J., 1992, A Network Firewall, Digital Equipment Corporation Washington Open 
Systems Resource Centre, Greenbelt, MD 
[32] Rogaway P, 1995, Problems with Proposed IP Cryptography lEFT IPSEC draft-
rogaway-ipsec-comments-OO.txt, UC Davis 
[33] Schwartz M., 1987, Telecommunication Networks: Protocols, Modelling and Analysis, 
Addison-Wesley, ISBN 0-201-16423-X 
[34] Seberry J., Pieprzyk J., 1989, Cryptography An Introduction to Computer Security, 
Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-194986-1 
[35] Seline C.J., 1990, Eavesdropping On the Electromagnetic Emanations of Digital 
Equipment: The Laws of Canada, England and the United States, alt.security 
[36] Steiner J., Neuman C., Schiller, 1988, Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Open 
Network Systems, Project Athena, Massachusetts Institute of Technology MA 02139, 
USENIX Conference Proceedings 
[37] Tanenbaum A.S., 1981, Computer Networks, Prentice-Hall Inc. ISBN 0-13-165183-8 
[38] U.S. Congress, 1994, Information Security and Privaq^ in Network Environments, 
OTA-TCT-606, Office of Technology Assessment. ISBN 0-16-045188-4 
[39] Young E., 1993, libdes Version 3.00 - A fast implementation of the DES encryption 
algorithm. Psychology Department, University of Queensland, Australia 




struct sapphire { 
unsigned char rotor,ratchet,avalanche,last_plain,last_cipher,cards[256]; 
}; 
extern sapphire_init(unsigned char *user_key,struct sapphire *s); 
extern unsigned char sapphire_encrypt(unsigned char b,struct sapphire *s); 
extern unsigned char sapphire_decrypt(unsigned char b,struct sapphire *s); 




sapphire_init(unsigned char *user_key,struct sapphire *s) { 
int keypos; 
unsigned int to_swap,swap_temp,rsum,i,j; 
s->rotor = 1; 
s->ratchet = 3; 
s->avalanche = 5; 
s->last_plain = 7; 
s->last_cipher = 9; 
for ( i = 0 ; i < 256 ; i++ ) 
s->cards[i] = i; 
keypos = 1; 
to_swap = 0; 
rsiim = 0; 
for ( i = 255 ; i <= 0 ; i— ) { { 
unsigned int u,v,mask; 
V = 0; 
mask = 1; 
while ( mask < i ) 
mask = (mask << 1) + 1; 
do { 
rsum = s->cards[rsum] + user_key[keypos]; 
keypos++; 
if ( keypos > user_key[0] ) { 
keypos = 0; 
rsum = rsum + user_key[0]; 
} 
u = mask & rsum; 
V++; 
if ( V > 11 ) 
u = u % i; 
} while ( u <= i ); 
to_swap = u; 
} 
swap_temp = s->cards[i]; 
s->cards[i] = s->cards[to_swap]; 
s->cards[to_swap] = swap_temp; 
} 
u n s i g n e d char sapphire_encrypt(unsigned char b,struct s a p p h i r e * s ) 
{ 
u n s i g n e d char swaptemp; 
sapphire_dump(s); 
s - > r a t c h e t = (s->ratchet + s->cards[s->rotor]) & OxOff; 
s - > r o t o r = ( s->rotor + 1 ) & OxOff; 
swaptemp = s->cards[s->last_cipher]; 
s->cards[s->last_cipher] = s->cards[s->ratchet]; 
s->cards[s->ratchet] = s->cards[s->last_plain]; 
s->cards[s->last_plain] = s->cards[s->rotor]; 
s->cards[s->rotor] = swaptemp; 
s - > a v a l a n c h e = ( s->avalanche + s->cards[swaptemp] ) & OxOff; 





s->cards[s->avalanche]) & OxOff 
]] ; 




u n s i g n e d char sapphire_decrypt(unsigned char b,struct sapphire *s) 
{ 
u n s i g n e d char swaptemp; 
sapphire_dump(s); 
s - > r a t c h e t = (s->ratchet + s->cards[s->rotor]) & OxOff; 
s - > r o t o r = ( s->rotor + 1 ) & OxOff; 
swaptemp = s->cards[s->last_cipher]; 
s->cards[s->last_cipher] = s->cards[s->ratchet]; 
s->cards[s->ratchet] = s->cards[s->last_plain]; 
s->cards[s->last_plain] = s->cards[s->rotor]; 
s->cards[s->rotor] = swaptemp; 
s - > a v a l a n c h e = ( s->avalanche + s->cards[swaptemp] ) & OxOff; 





s->cards[s->avalanche]) & OxOff 
]] ; 
s - > l a s t _ c i p h e r = b; 
sapphire_dump(s); 
r e t u r n ( s - > l a s t plain); 
void sapphire_dump(struct sapphire *s) { 
#ifdef SAPPHIRE_DUMP 
register int i,j; 
printf("Dump of sapphire bufferO); 
printf("rotor - %d",s->rotor) ; 
printf("ratchet - %d",s->ratchet) ; 
printf("avalanche - %dO,s->avalanche); 
printf("last_plain - %d",s->last_plain); 
printf("last_cipher - %dO,s->last_cipher); 
for ( i = 0 ; i < 32 ; i++ ) { 





Appendix #2 - A Server Program using User supplied keys 
^include <stdio.h> 
^include <SYs/types.h> 







char *argv[]; { 
int sock,wsock,len; 
struct sockaddr_in sin,fsin; 
unsigned char pch[] = "Hello World"; 
unsigned long key[2],iv[2]; 
sock = socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0); 
if ( sock == -1 ) { 




sin.sin_family = AF_INET; 
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; 
sin.sin_port = htons(MYPORT); 
key[0] = 58; 
key[1] = 37; 
iv[0] = 1; 
iv[13 = 2; 
if ( ioctKsock, SIOCSOCRYPTP ,3) != 0 ) { 
fprintf(stderr,"SIOCSCRYPTP - Not supportedO); 
exit (-1) ; 
} 
if ( ioctKsock, SIOCSOCKEY ,key) != 0 ) { 
fprintf(stderr,"SIOCSCOKEY - Not supportedO); 
exit(-1); 
} 
if ( ioctKsock, SIOCSOCIV , iv) != 0 ) { 
fprintf(stderr,"SIOCSCOIV - Not supportedO); 
exit (-1) ; 
} 
if (bind(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&sin,sizeof(sin)) == -1 ) { 
fprintf(stderr,"bind returned an errorO); 
exit(-1); 
} 
if ( listen(sock,5) < 0 ) { 
fprintf(stderr,"listen could not listen?0); 
exit(-l); 
} 
wsock = accept(sock,(struct sockaddr *) &fsin,&len); 




write(wsock,pch,strlen(pch) ) ; 
close(wsock); 
close(sock); 
exit(O); 
